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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 19, 2001 the Hungarian Parliament passed the Act on
Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries by an overwhelming 92.4
percent majority.' The Act, also referred to as the Hungarian Status Law,
grants, inter alia, Hungarian work permits and subsidized travel to ethnic
Hungarians living in Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, Yugoslavia, Croatia,
and Slovenia.2 The Hungarian Status Law entered into force amidst
protest from neighboring countries on January 1, 2002. The most
adamant objections came from Slovakia and Romania, which are home
to the largest number of ethnic Hungarians. These countries claim that
the Status Law violates principles of international law.3 Indeed, both the
Council of Europe and most recently the European Union5 have
expressed doubts regarding the legality of the Hungarian Status Law.
This Note analyzes the Hungarian Status Law in the context of
general principles of international law. By specifically examining the
Hungarian minority, this Note questions whether the implementation of
the Hungarian Status Law is the most effective method of ensuring the
protection and respect of the Hungarian minority in Eastern Europe. The
conclusion argues that the unilateral approach of the Hungarian Status
Law should be abandoned for a bilateral approach to secure rights for the
Hungarian minority.
The first Part of this Note traces the development of minority rights
protection in the twentieth century and considers the need for measures
to ensure the protection of and respect for the Hungarian minority. The
second Part examines different international agreements and procedures
available to ensure the protection and respect of minorities in Europe.
The third Part outlines the kin-State action in Central Eastern Europe,
specifically examining the Status Law and bilateral treaties concerning
1. Act LXII of 2001, On Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries (2001), 40
I.L.M. 1242 [hereinafter Hungarian Status Law].
2. Id. arts. 8, 15.
3. See Press Release, Gov't of Rom., Declaration of the Romanian Government with
Regard to the Adoption of the Law on the Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries (June
6, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter Rom. Gov't Declaration] ("The Law in its entirety
has a discriminatory character, in contradiction with the international documents applicable in
the field of minorities")
4. Eur. Comm'n for Democracy Through Law (Venice Comm'n), Report on the
Preferential Treatment of National Minorities by Their Kin-State, adopted Oct. 19-20, 2001,48th
plen. mtg. [hereinafter Venice Comm'n Rep.], available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2001/
CDL-INF(2001)0l9-e.html.
5. Letter from Gunter Verheugen, EU Commissioner on Enlargement, to the Premiers
of Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia (Dec. 18, 2002) (on file with author); Slovak Foreign
Minister Satisfied with EU Commissioner's Stance on Status Law, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Dec.
19, 2002, available at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/12/3-CEE/cee- 191202.asp.
[Vol. 24:961
The Act on Hungarians Living Abroad
ethnic minorities entered into by Hungary. The fourth Part analyzes the
Status Law in the context of the principles of international law. Lastly,
this Note considers the future of the Hungarian Status Law and suggests
an alternative methodology for Hungary to achieve its stated goals with
respect to protection of ethnic Hungarians residing abroad.
II. INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO PROTECT
AND RESPECT MINORITIES
The protection of national minorities is established in international
law as necessary to promote peace and stability.6 However, the manner in
which national minorities should be protected is by no means clear. No
conclusive definition of the term minority exists. This creates uncertainty
about the best mechanism for minority protection. The Greco-Bulgarian
Communities case acknowledged the fact that there must be an objective
difference between the majority and a minority in a State.7 The case
defined a community as:
a group of persons living in a given country or locality hav[ing]
a race, religion, language and tradition of their own and united
by this identity of race, religion, language and tradition in a
sentiment of solidarity, with a view to preserving their traditions,
maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the instruction and
upbringing of their children in accordance with the spirit and
tradition of their race and rendering mutual assistance to each
other.'
Both the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights recognized that "it was difficult, if not
impossible, to group together under a satisfactory definition every
6. The Explanatory Report of the Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities states that in 1993 the Heads of State and Government of the Council of
Europe's Member States agreed that "the national minorities which the upheavals of history
have established in Europe had to be protected and respected as a contribution to peace and
stability." Explanatory Report of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities, para. 5, Feb. 1, 1995, Europ. T.S. No. 157, reprinted in FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES: COLLECTED TEXTS 18 (2d ed. 2001)
[hereinafter Explanatory Report of the Framework Convention]; see also Venice Comm'n
Rep., supra note 4.
7. Geoff Gilbert, The Legal Protection Accorded to Minority Groups in Europe, 23
NETH. Y.B. INT'L. L. 67, 71 (1992).
8. 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) Nos. 17, 19, 21, 22, and 33.
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minority group in need of special measures of protection."9 Francesco
Capotorti, Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities used the term
''minority" to refer to:
[a] group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a
State, in a non-dominant position, whose members-being
nationals of the State-possess ethnic, religious or linguistic
characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population
and show[ing], if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed
towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or
language.' °
This definition is most commonly followed in international law." Yet,
even a Council of Europe committee of experts in human rights declared
there is "no consensus on the interpretation of the term 'national
minorities.' ' ',2 Furthermore, attempts to define the term are often
discouraged."
This Section traces the emergence of minority rights throughout the
twentieth century. The nineteenth century policy of non-interventionism
stunted the development of international human rights until the early
twentieth century. 4 The approach changed with the formation of the
9. Francesco Capotorti, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, para. 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1,
U.N. Sales No. E.78.XIV.I (1979). Capotorti reports that the Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities strongly recommended that the Commission on
Human Rights adopt a draft resolution defining minorities for purpose of protection by the
United Nations. Id. para. 22. The Commission on Human Rights continually referred the issue
back to the Sub-Commission for further study. Id. After many attempts to define the term
minority, the Sub-Commission deferred attempts to find an adequate definition until
specifically directed to do so by the Commission on Human Rights. Id. paras. 22-27 (internal
citations omitted).
10. Id. para. 568.
11. Gilbert, supra note 7, at 7 1.
12. Explanatory Report of the Framework Convention, supra note 6, para. 4.
13. Members of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities generally recognized that
it was extremely difficult to state precisely what the term covered and, in the view
of some members, it would be an impossible task to try and define a concept that
embraced a very dynamic reality varying considerably from one country to another.
Consequently, the attempt should not be made.
Capotorti, supra note 9, para. 568.
14. See Michael R. Geroe & Thomas K. Gump, Hungary and a New Paradigm for the
Protection of Ethnic Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
673, 676 (1995) ("In the 19th century, the general concept of international human rights made
little sense in light of an established policy that nation-states would not interfere in each
other's affairs.")
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League of Nations at the end of World War I. The League of Nations
"guaranteed treaties designed to protect the rights of minorities located
in both the defeated and newly created countries in the wake of World
War I!' These treaties contained provisions directing, inter alia,
nondiscrimination, equal treatment under the law, and factual equality for
members of minority groups.'6 While intended to preserve international
peace, they provided more protection in theory than in reality and served
as a catalyst for further conflict.'7 The League of Nations did not function
as envisioned, eventually falling apart. 8
The failure of the League of Nations tainted the notion of minority
rights.' 9 Drafters of international treaties signed after World War II
distinguished minority rights and individual rights.0 Post-war documents
provided human rights protection to individuals rather than minority
groups.' Under this approach, "a broad system of individual rights ...
would by itself protect the legitimate interests of members of national
minorities, if supported by a strong prohibition against discrimination
based on race, ethnicity, language or religion. 22 While the United
Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights is devoid of any
mention of minority rights, blanket terms such as "everyone" and "all
human beings" were expected to fulfill this goal.23
Communist rule in Central Eastern Europe during the latter half of
the twentieth century suppressed the expression of ethnic and national
identity.' According to Marxist theory, political and social conflict
would cease. Thus, diverging group interests would be transcended 5
Soviet policy recognized different nationalities, but attempted to control
15. Id. at 677.
16. David Wippman, The Evolution and Implementation of Minority Rights, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 600 (1997).
17. Geroe & Gump, supra note 14, at 677; see also WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL
CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 57 (1995) ("The first important
change in liberal views came with the failure of the League of Nations' minority protection
scheme, and its role in the outbreak of World War II."). Kymlicka explains how the unmet
demands of the internationally recognized German-speaking minorities in Czechoslovakia and
Poland were used as a pretext for Nazi aggression.
18. See generally F.S. NORTHEDGE, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 255-77 (1986).
19. Patrick Thomberry, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities: Background, Analysis, Observations,
and an Update, in UNIVERSAL MINORITY RIGHTS 17 (Alan Phillips & Allan Rosas eds., 1995).
20. Id. at 17.
21. Geroe & Gump, supra note 14, at 677.
22. Wippman, supra note 16, at 602-03.
23. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP REPORT 1 1 (Mar. 1991).
24. Michael A. McFaul, Introduction, 10 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 109, 112 (2002).
25. Id. at III.
Spring 2003]
Michigan Journal of International Law
the minority groups. 6 The communist regimes sought "to drain
nationality of its content even while legitimating it as a form, and
thereby to promote the long-term withering away of nationality as a vital
component of social life."27
The fall of communism in Central Eastern Europe produced a revival
of ethnic tension in the region.28 The demise of communism has been
followed by "a rekindling of long-smoldering ethnic and national
problems which could lead to conflict.' 29 The Soviet strategy resulted in
a region where countries were unable to integrate minorities into
society.3° Young democracies lacked democratic traditions and had weak
economies. This led to a "heightened sense of identification of
individuals with their respective ethnic group."'" This identification
allowed individuals to distinguish their group from the "guilty" group
responsible for the "predicament."3 Politicians seized power in post-
communist countries by seizing the opportunity to "build their rule on
the democratic and economic deficits" of their countries.33 Nationalistic
politicians remain influential in post-communist countries; ethnic
conflict and nationalism pose a danger to regional and national security,
34threatening stability and peace of the region.
26. Steven R. Ratner, Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?, 32
N.YU. J. INT'L L. & POL. 591, 597 (2000).
27. ROGERS BRUBAKER, NATIONALISM REFRAMED: NATIONHOOD AND THE NATIONAL
QUESTION IN THE NEW EUROPE 25 (1996), cited in Ratner, supra note 26, at 597 n. 11.
28. See Celestine Bohlen, East Europe's Past Imperils 3 Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
1990, at A16; Jan Urban, Eastern Europe-Divided It Fails, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 21, 1990, at
A23.
29. U.N. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Summary Record of the 17th Meeting, para. 4, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1992 SR.17 (Feb. 7, 1992).
30. Ratner, supra note 26, at 598.
31. Id. at 598 (internal citations omitted).
32. E.J. HOBSBAWN, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRAMME, MYTH,
REALITY 174 (2d ed. 1992), cited in Ratner, supra note 26, at 598 n.14.
33. Ratner, supra note 26, at 598. Ratner cites ultranationalists Franjo Tudjman of
Croatia and Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia as examples of politicians who secured power by
exploiting the democratic and economic conditions of their respective countries. Ratner is also
careful to point out that whether nationalism emerged as a result of conscious political
decisions to secure power is debated. Id. at 598 n.14.
34. See U.N. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., supra note 29, para. 38; MICHAEL KYMLICKA,
ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 3 (1997) ("[w]hat replaced communism in most of Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union was not liberal democracy but ethnonationalism ....
What used to be seen as stable liberal democracies are now riven by bitter disputes between
ethnocultural groups over immigration and multiculturalism, and some even face the threat of
secession.")
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III. THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY
The turbulent Magyar history of the twentieth century left millions
of ethnic Hungarians living outside the borders of the Hungarian State.35
Contemporary Hungarian history is haunted by the memory of the 1920
Treaty of Trianon.36 In the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary lost two-thirds of
its territory and three-fifths of its population.37 As a result, ethnic
Hungarians now, make up the largest minority in Europe.3" Since 1920,
members of the Hungarian minority have been subjects of multiple
different countries.3 9 The New York Times reported the story of Reverend
Zsigmond Csukas. Reverend Csukas, an elderly pastor of the Hungarian
Reformed Church in a Hungarian town in Slovakia, has been a citizen of
five different countries without ever having left his hometown near the
border of Hungary and Slovakia. Born in 1918 into the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, Reverend Csukas became a Czechoslovakian citizen
after the end of World War I, when Central Eastern Europe was carved
into more ethnically homogenous nation-states. In 1938 his village was
returned to Hungary by Nazi Germany. After World War II, this land was
returned to Czechoslovakia. With the break up of Czechoslovakia in
1993, Reverend Csukas obtained his fifth passport-this one from the
Slovak Republic. °
Since Trianon, Hungarians within Hungary have lamented the plight
of their Magyar compatriots now living abroad.4 Discrimination against
the Hungarian minority appears in many forms, most commonly
indirect.42 Central European countries subtly discriminate against the
35. Patrick Thomberry, Hungarian Bilateral Treaties, in PROTECTION OF MINORITY
RIGHTS THROUGH BILATERAL TREATIES: THE CASE OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 130
(Arie Bloed & Pieter van Dijk eds., 1999).
36. Der rumanisch-ungarische Optantenstreit vor dem Gemischten Schiedsgericht und
dem V61kerbund: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Lehre von der Enteignung im Volkerrecht (1920)
[hereinafter Treaty of Trianon]. For an English translation, see Treaty of Peace Between the
Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary and Protocol and Declaration, Signed at Trianon
June 4, 1920, available at http://www.lib.byu.edu/-rdh/wwi/versaltri5.htm.
37. COUNT ALBERT APPONYI ET AL., JUSTICE FOR HUNGARY: REVIEW AND CRITICISM
OF THE EFFECT OF THE TREATY OF TRIANON 125 (1928) ("Of all the Peace Treaties concluded
after the world war, the Treaty of Trianon is undoubtedly the harshest, the most inhuman, and
the most unjust. Upon none of the vanquished were such terrible penalties, threatening the
very existence of the nation, inflicted as upon Hungary."); OTTO LEGRADY, JUSTICE FOR
HUNGARY 17 (1933).
38. See Geroe & Gump, supra note 14, 677 n.8 (citing Kristian Gerner, Ethnic Rights as
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY 167 (Vojtech Masmy et al. eds., 1991)).
39. Stephen Engelberg & Judith Ingram, Now Hungary Adds its Voice to the Ethnic
Tumult, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1993, atA3.
40. Id.
41. Geroe & Gump, supra note 14, at 684.
42. Id.
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Hungarian minority by failing to make allowances for their customs and
traditions.4 ' As Geroe and Gump point out, "[w]hile such provisions do
not specifically discriminate against minority groups on their face, the
fact that the government forces minority members to use cultural
elements belonging to the national majority could contribute to the
gradual decimation of minority cultures as they assimilate into the
majority culture.""
Though it is settled in international law that assimilation is not a
valid governmental policy,45  indirect discrimination exists in the
countries surrounding Hungary. Indeed such indirect discrimination is
State sanctioned. In Romania and Slovakia, constitutional provisions
declare the official language of instruction in schools to be Romanian
and Slovakian.4 '6 Georghe Funar, the current mayor of Cluj-Napoca, a
historically Hungarian town currently under Romanian sovereignty,
directed the painting of park benches and flagpoles in the colors of the
Romanian flag.4 '7  Funar has also banned conferences involving
Hungarians and has tried to prohibit Hungarian language signs
identifying streets, schools, and other civic institutions. 8
The need to protect the rights and the interests of all minorities
living in Europe is recognized in both Europe and beyond.49 Global and
local organizations have concluded treaties to further this aim.50 The
Republic of Hungary, in light of the situation regarding the "Hungarians
abroad," Hatdron Tali Magyarok,5' took a proactive stance on the rights
43. See infra notes 46-49.
44. Geroe & Gump, supra note 14, at 684.
45. Wippman, supra note 16, at 605.
46. ROM. CONST. art. 13; SLOVK. CONST. art. 6.
47. Andrew Purvis, The Empire Strikes Back, TIME (Europe), Feb. 25, 2002,
http://www.time.comtime/europe/magazine/article/0, 13005,901020225-203631,00.html.
48. Engelberg & Ingram, supra note 39, at A3.
49. See, e.g., U.N. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., supra note 29, para. 62 (Mr. Mezzalama
(Italy) "said that they need for a body of principles on the delicate question of the rights of
persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities had become more and
more urgent."). Mr. Fatio of the Baha'i International Community stated that the Draft
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief represented an important step toward developing universally accepted
guiding principles on which a dynamic social order responsive to the needs of minorities could
be founded. Id. para. 89.
50. See, e.g., Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Europ.
T.S. No. 157; 34 I.L.M. 351 (1995) [hereinafter Framework Convention], reprinted in
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES: COLLECTED
TEXTS, supra note 6, at 7.
51. Stephen Deets & Sherrill Stroschein, Minority Autonomy in Liberal Democracies:
Rights, Justice, and Hungarians in Central Europe (manuscript at 3), Paper Presented at the
43d International Studies Association Convention, New Orleans (2002). The government
office addressing matters of the Hungarian minority abroad is named Hatdron Tfili Magyarok
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of their ethnic kin by passing the Hungarian Status Law in June 2001.52
The following Part outlines the most significant documents and
procedures pertaining to minority protection available to the Hungarian
minority.
IV. PROCEDURES FOR MINORITY PROTECTION
A. Global Agreements
The United Nations system concerns itself with minority protection,
albeit weakly. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights53
is one of the most important human rights treaties, seen by some as the
"foundation for minority protection in the contemporary international
system."55 Article 27 is the sole provision in the ICCPR regarding
minority rights. 6 Article 27 addresses cultural, religious, and linguistic
rights:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied
the right, in community with the other members of their group,
to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own
religion, or to use their own language. 7
The ICCPR creates an obligation on each ratifying State to ensure
the individual rights enumerated in the Covenant." To assure domestic
remedy of ICCPR violations, each State must take the steps necessary to
implement the rights protections.59 This implementation occurs via the
legislature of some other adequate body.60
Hivatala (Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad); Hatdron Tdli Magyarok is an
official term of the Hungarian government. See www.htmh.hu/english.htm.
52. Hungarian Status Law, supra note 1.
53. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
179, 6 I.L.M. 368, 375-76 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR].
54. See, e.g., Thornberry, supra note 19, at 20.
55. ALESSANDRA LUINI DEL Russo, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
31 (1971), cited in Geroe & Gump, supra note 14, at 678.
56. ICCPR, supra note 53, art. 27. Though the right to identity of minorities is not
named in article 27, it is the general focus of the article. The general comment of the Human
Rights Committee on article 27 identifies the protection "of the identity of a minority" as a
goal of article 27. See Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 23, Report of the Human
Rights Committee, vol. I, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. 40, at 107-19, para. 6.2, U.N. Doc.
A/49/40 (1994), available at http://lawhk.hku.hk/demo/unhrdocs/hrgc23.htm.
57. ICCPR, supra note 53.
58. DEL Russo, supra note 55, at 43.
59. Id.; see also ICCPR, supra note 53.
60. DEL Russo, supra note 55, at 43.
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Article 27 is not without its shortcomings. It is formulated in
negative terms, stating that these rights "shall not be denied. 6' However,
article 27 is interpreted by some as imposing a positive obligation uponStat s t assst .. 62
States to assist minorities. Special Rapporteur Capotorti was of the
opinion that article 27 requires "active and sustained measures" on the
part of States.63 A "positive" reading of article 27 has been accepted by
some States. 4  The Human Rights Committee endorses this
interpretation: "The obligation under the Covenant is not confined to the
respect of human rights, but ... States parties have also undertaken to
ensure the enjoyment of these rights to all individuals under their
jurisdiction. This aspect calls for specific activities."65
Thornberry argues that the requirement of "specific activities"
beyond mere "enactments" suggests the allocation of resources. 66 Insofar
as human rights consume resources,67 article 27 applies to civil and
political rights.68
The phrase "[i]n those States in which ... minorities exist" 69
weakens the Covenant's application to States. Rather than referring to all
minorities, "it almost invites States to declare that they have no
minorities on their territory.' 70 However, the Human Rights Committee of
the United Nations insists that the "existence of an ethnic, religious, or
linguistic minority in a given State party does not depend upon a
decision by that State party but requires to be established by objective
criteria."'" Thus, the existence of minorities is a question of fact, not law,
and cannot be decisive for the application of article 27.72
61. See ICCPR, supra note 53, art. 27.
62. Wippman, supra note 16.
63. Capotorti, supra note 9, para. 588.
64. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. See U.N. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.,
supra note 29, para. 69.
65. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. 40, at 109,
U.N. Doc. A/37/40.
66. Thornberry, supra note 19, at 25.
67. Id. Thornberry argues that all human rights consume resources "since even the most
commonly accepted and basic freedoms such as the right to a fair trial ... require a state
infrastructure to secure them in practice." Id.
68. Id.
69. ICCPR, supra note 53, art. 27.
70. Thornberry, supra note 19, at 21.
71. General Comment No. 23, supra note 56.
72. Thornberry, supra note 19, at 21-22. Thornberry cites the Greco-Bulgarian
Communities case as evidence that the "factual" nature of existence criteria has existed in
international law since the beginning of the twentieth century. See Advisory Opinion No. 17,
Greco-Bulgarian Community, 1930 P.C.I.J. (Ser. B) No. 17, at 22.
This Note does not attempt to define the rights of minorities that must be protected.
Simply put, two theories of minority rights exist: individual rights and collective and/or group
rights. The classic theory of human rights is based upon individual rights concepts. The
assumption is that "group rights would be taken care of automatically as the result of the
[Vol. 24:961
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Lastly, the right recognized in article 27 is granted only to
individuals-"persons belonging to such minorities."73 The rights in
article 27 are not group rights;74 instead, they may be viewed as "an
individual right collectively exercised."75 While the rights are to be
enjoyed "in community with the other members of their group," the
protections offered in article 27 "should be understood as predominantly
individual rather than collective rights.
76
Universal documents that specifically name minority groups are
sparse and widely varied. 7  The International Conventions on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 9 and the Political Rights of
protection of the rights of individuals." Ian Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern
International Law, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 2 (1988).
Collective fights measures establish human rights guarantees at a minority group level.
Kymlicka notes that while the idea of group rights remains substantially unexplored in
Western political philosophy, "[t]he resurgence of ethnonational conflict in both the East and
the West has reignited interest in the issue of 'group rights.'" KYMLICKA, supra note 34, at 3.
Conversely, Deets and Stroschein state that "European agreements have specifically denied the
existence of collective fights ... clearest in the eventual rejection of Recommendation 1201
and the negative reaction to the Hungarian Status Law." However, they agree with Kymlicka in
that the West "should clarify the liberal principles upon which the majority of rights
documents are based.' Deets & Stroschein, supra note 51 (manuscript at 33). In fact, the
constitutions of many Central Eastern European countries guarantee group rights. The
Constitution of the Republic of Hungary grants ethnic minorities the fight to local self-
government and the right to educate members in their native language. See REP. HUNG.
CONST. arts. 68(2), 68(4). The Romanian Constitution guarantees organizations of national
minorities one seat in Parliament each if they fail to receive the number of votes necessary for
representation. See ROM. CONST. art. 59(2). The Slovakian Constitution guarantees minorities
the right to use their minority language in dealings with government authorities and the right
to educate their members in their native language. SLOVK. REP. CONST. art. 34(2)(a).
Geroe and Gump argue that collective rights should not replace individual rights, but
rather supplement the existing fights regime. The authors contend that enactment of collective
rights measures at the international level will substantially improve the protection of minority
fights in Central Eastern Europe. Geroe & Gump, supra note 14.
73. ICCPR, supra note 53, art. 27.
74. Thornberry, supra note 19, at 23.
75. Id.
76. Wippman, supra note 16, at 604; see also Louis B. Sohn, The Rights of Minorities,
in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
270, 274 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981); Arie Bloed & Pieter van Dijk, Introduction to PROTECTION
OF MINORITY RIGHTS THROUGH BILATERAL TREATIES supra note 35, at 4.
77. Thornberry, supra note 19, at 19.
78. 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 350 (1966). ("Special measures taken for the sole
purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals
requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals
equal enjoyment of exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms.. " Art. 1(4)).
79. 1015 U.N.T.S. 243, 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974).
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Women,8" all address the need for special measures for minorities and
"aim at eliminating barriers to equality among individuals."8'
A second United Nations instrument is the Declaration on the Rights
of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities." The Declaration is formally nonbinding, but is recognized
as "an important point of reference in the field of global minority rights
protection."83 The Declaration establishes the rights of persons belonging
to minorities, though, like the ICCPR, it fails to define minority or how
to determine membership of a minority group. 84 Unlike article 27, the
Declaration is formulated in positive terms.8" Further, it designates
several rights of persons belonging to a minority group, such as the right
to use minority language, culture, and religion, and social and political
decision making.86
B. Regional Agreements
The Council of Europe, created in 1949 to promote democracy, the
rule of law, and unity among Western European countries, has a
significant record concerning human rights. 7 The Council of Europe
initially stood as a group of States ideologically opposed to
communism.88 The organization now aims to protect human rights and
pluralist democracy and to seek solutions to discrimination against
minorities, among other things.89 To be admitted to the Council, a State
must "accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all
80. 193 U.N.T.S. 135, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980).
81. Wippman, supra note 16, at 604.
82. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.734 (July 2, 1980).
83. Bloed & van Dijk, supra note 76, at 4.
84. Id. At the seventeenth meeting of the forty-eighth session of the Commission on
Human Rights in which representatives discussed the final draft of the Declaration on the
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,
Hungary specifically regretted the failure of the declaration to give a clear definition of
minorities. Summary Record of the 17th Meeting, supra note 29, para. 12.
85. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, supra note 82, art. 2(1) ("Persons belonging to national or
ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities ... have the right to enjoy their own culture, to
profess and practice their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in public,
freely and without interference or any form of discrimination.") (emphasis added).
86. Id.; see also Bloed & van Dijk, supra note 76, at 4-5. For further discussion, see
Thomberry, supra note 19, at 39--62. -
87. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT 789 (2000).
88. Id.
89. Council of Europe Overview, available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/Communication_
andResearch/Contacts-withjthepublic/AboutCouncil ofEurope/An -overview/ (last visited
June 2, 2003).
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persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental
freedoms."9
1. European Convention on Human Rights
Member State collaboration with the Council of Europe involves
signing the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the first
treaty that emerged from the Council of Europe in 1950.9' The ECHR is
a seminal document in the field of international human rights.92 It was the
first treaty to deal with international human rights, and has the most
judicially developed human rights system.93 The ECHR continues to
evolve through the addition of protocols strengthening the rights and
improving the protection mechanism. 94
The ECHR does not directly guarantee minority rights.95 The
European Court of Human Rights, in interpreting the Convention, stated
"[t]he Convention does not provide for any rights of a ... minority as
such, and the protection of individual members of such minority is
limited to the right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of
the Convention rights on the grounds of their belonging to the
minority."96 Article 14 is a nondiscrimination provision: "The enjoyment
of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured
without discrimination on any ground, such as sex, race, color, language,
religious, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association
with a national minority, property, birth or other status."97
The ECHR does not provide adequate minority protection. The
inadequacy of the Convention is due to the fact that the ECHR sees the
90. Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, art. 3, Europ. T.S. No. 1, reprinted
in A.H. ROBERTSON, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE: ITS STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONS AND
ACHIEVEMENTS app. 1 (1961).
91. STEINER.& ALSTON, supra note 87, at 789.
92. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 87, at 788; Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 232 [hereinafter ECHR].
93. Id.
94. Introduction to EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COLLECTED TEXTS 9
(Council of Eur. Press 1994).
95. A protocol directly guaranteeing minority rights is under consideration. At the 1993
Vienna Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe's Member
States, the Heads of State instructed the Committee of Ministers to "begin work on drafting a
protocol complementing the European Convention on Human Rights in the cultural field by
provisions guaranteeing individual rights, in particular for persons belonging to national
minorities." See Explanatory Report of the Framework Convention, supra note 6, para. 5.
96. X. v. Austria, App. No. 8142/78, 18 Eur. Comn'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 88, 92-93
(1979), cited in Gilbert, supra note 7, at 81.
97. ECHR, supra note 92, art. 14.
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minority question only in the context of discrimination.98 By itself, article
14 an insufficient method of minority protection. 99 As a nondiscrimination
provision, article 14 is not a true guarantee of minority rights."'0
Article 14 is not an autonomous provision.'0 ' An applicant to the
European Court of Human Rights can refer to article 14 only in
conjunction with another article."' "Article 14 has no independent
existence, but plays an important role by complementing the other
normative provisions of the Convention and the Protocols."'' 3 This
deficiency can be compensated if the European Court on Human Rights
and the European Commission on Human Rights take a liberal view of the
scope of the Convention.'°4 However, the nonautonomous nature of article
14 explains the failure of the Court and Commission to enlarge its scope."°5
2. Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities
The Council of Europe adopted specific standards for the protection of
national minorities in the 1994 Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities."' The Framework Convention aims to "specify the
legal principles which States undertake to respect in order to ensure the
protection of national minorities."'' 7 The goal of the Convention is "the
effective protection of national minorities and that of the rights and
98. PITER KovAcs, The Context and the History of the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities in Europe, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MINORITY
PROTECTION: RIGHTS OF MINORITIES OR LAW OF MINORITIES? 80, 82 (2000).
99. Id.
100. Geoff Gilbert, The Council of Europe and Minority Rights, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 160,
160 (1996).
101. See KovAcs, supra note 98, at 82.
102. See id.; see also PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF
MINORITIES 300 (1991). "The Commission of Human Rights holds that Article 13 only
sanctions the principle of non-discrimination as regards enjoyment of the rights and freedoms
set out in the Convention, and initially held that violations of Article 14 presupposed
violations of another article of the Convention." Id. at 300 (citing App. No. 86/55; App. No.
107/56; App. No. 436/58; App. No. 2373/64; App. No. 2145/64; App. No. 3325/67; App. No.
6745/74; App. No. 6746/74; App. No. 808/60) (internal citations omitted).
103. M. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10316/83, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
129, 134 (1984).
104. KovAcs, supra note 98, at 82-83; see also Heinrich Klebes, The Council of
Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 16 HUM. RTS. L.J.
92 (1995).
105. KovAcs, supra note 98, at 97. ("The non-autonomous nature of this article made it
hardly possible to articulate concerns linked to minority protection before the European
Commission on Human Rights and the European Court on Human Rights. That's why the
jurisprudential activism and the case-law could not realize the enlargement of the scope, which
they do practically with all other articles of the ECHR.")
106. Framework Convention, supra note 50.
107. Explanatory Report of the Framework Convention, supra note 6, para. 10.
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freedoms of persons belonging to those minorities within the rule of law,
respecting the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of states"'"
The Framework Convention is an international treaty and therefore a
binding legal instrument.'09 It is the first legally binding multilateral
instrument devoted to the protection of national minorities."' The
Framework Convention contains "mostly programme-type provisions
setting out objectives which the Parties undertake to pursue.' The
provisions of the Framework Convention are not directly applicable and
give States "discretion in the implementation of the objective which they
have undertaken to achieve.""' 2 Thus, the Framework Convention
"formulates a number of .vaguely defined objectives and principles, the
observation of which will be an obligation of the Contracting States but
not a right.""' The fact that States are given wide discretion in
implementation of the Framework Convention weakens its effect
considerably.'
14
The rights provided to minorities in the Framework Convention are no
more than "watered-down versions" of minority rights.' '5 Many articles are
restricted by clauses such as "as far as possible""'  or "within the
framework of their legal systems." 
7
Like article 27 of the ICCPR, the Framework Convention does not
recognize collective rights."8 Rather, "[t]he emphasis is placed on the
protection of persons belonging to national minorities, who exercise their
rights individually and in community with others."'9
The implementation machinery is "feeble" at best.' 20 There is no
judicial or quasi-judicial organ. 2' The Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe monitors the implementation of the Framework
108. Framework Convention, supra note 50.
109. Klebes, supra note 104, at 93.
110. Explanatory Report of the Framework Convention, supra note 6, para. 10.
111. Id. para 11.
112. Id.; see also Klebes, supra note 104, at 97 n.23 (citing Binding Report, Doc 7228 of
31.1. 1995).
113. Id.
114. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 87.
115. Wippman, supra note 16, at 611.
116. Framework Convention, supra note 50, art. 10(2) ("[Tlhe Parties shall endeavor to
ensure, as far as possible, the conditions which would make it possible to use the minority
language... ").
117. Id. art. 14(2) ("[I]f there is sufficient demand, the Parties should endeavor to ensure,
as far as possible and within the framework of their education systems, that persons belonging
to those minorities have adequate opportunities for being taught the minority language...
see also Klebes, supra note 104, at 94.
118. Explanatory Report of the Framework Convention, supra note 6, para. 13.
119. Id.
120. Klebes, supra note 104, at 94.
121. See Framework Convention, supra note 50, arts. 24-26.
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Convention. The Committee of Ministers evaluates the adequacy of the
measures taken.'22 Only States may submit reports to the Committee of
Ministers based on article 25. '23 Thus, there is no forum for individuals,
nongovernmental organizations, or the national minority.'24 The fear of
many is that "the monitoring process may be left entirely to the
governments."' 25  Left to governments, the Framework Convention's
effectiveness is "dependent solely on national legislation and
governmental policies which are monitored on the basis of reports
submitted by those same governments."'
26
3. Organization for Security andCo-operation
in Europe (OSCE)
The Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) in Europe
has adopted multiple formal documents pertaining to minorities.'27
Originally opened as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe (CSCE), it met to expand upon the obligations of the Helsinki
Accord. 28 The result of these conferences was a series of "Concluding
Documents," the most important of which was the concluding document
of the CSCE's Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human
122. Id.
123. Article 25(1) states:
Within a period of one year following the entry into force of this framework
Convention in respect of a Contracting Party, the latter shall transmit to the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe full information on the legislative and
other measures taken to give effect to the principles set out in this framework
Convention.
id. art. 25(l).
124. Gilbert, supra note 100, at 188.
125. Recommendation 1255(1995)1, On the Protection of the Rights of National Minorities,
adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 31 January 1995, http://assembly.coe.int/
Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/Adopted Text/ta95/EREC1255. htm, cited by
Klebes, supra note 104, at 94.
126. Gilbert, supra note 100, at 188.
127. See, e.g., Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1,
1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292; Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on Human
Dimension, June 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1305; Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990,
30 I.L.M. 190 (1991); Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting 1986 of Representatives
of the Participating State of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Jan. 17,
1989, 28 I.L.M. 527 (1989); Document of the Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension,
Emphasizing Respect for Human Rights, Pluralist Democracy, the Rule of Law, and
Procedures for Fact-Finding, Oct. 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1670.
128. In 1995, the CSCE transformed into the OSCE. In the Helsinki Final Act of 1975,
European States recognized the inviolability of their post-WWII borders and pledged to
respect basic human rights. Ratner, supra note 26, at 604.
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Dimension.12 This concluding document created a mechanism to
monitor the implementation of human rights principles.
Paragraph 32 of the Copenhagen Document guarantees the right of
an individual the freedom to choose to belong to a national minority. It
further grants the right of persons belonging to national minorities to
"express, preserve and develop their ethnic, culture, linguistic or
religious identity ..... ,,3, The Copenhagen Document is significant in
that it "mark[s] the change in the state's role and reflect[s] the evolution
in public opinion across Europe on what constitute[ ] just policies."'32
Since Copenhagen, European norms on minority policy "have shifted
dramatically from a negative rights perspective of preventing state
discrimination against minorities to requiring states to preserve and
support such groups."'33
Though the Copenhagen Document marks a positive change in
European policy toward minorities, the implementation mechanisms of
the OSCE are unsophisticated.'34 The provisions governing minorities in
this document are at most, politically binding.' While some view the
nonbinding nature of the OSCE as a detriment to the organization, it is
precisely this element that may have contributed to the development of
innovative human rights procedures and standards.' 36
129. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 87, at 792; see Document of the Copenhagen
Meeting of the Conference on Human Dimension, supra note 127. This document explains
that "human dimension" is the CSCE's term for human rights and humanitarian issues, one of
several dimensions of comprehensive security. See id.
130. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on Human Dimension,
supra note 127, para. 32.
131. Id. Paragraph 32 further grants national minorities the right to use their mother
tongue in public and private, establish and maintain their own educational, cultural, and
religious institutions, practice their religion, and establish and maintain unimpeded contacts
among themselves within their country as well as contacts across frontiers with citizens of
other States with whom they share a common ethnic or national origin, cultural heritage, or
religious beliefs. Id.
132. Deets & Stroschein, supra note 51 (manuscript at 10).
133. Id. (manuscript at 10).
134. Wippman, supra note 16, at 615.
135. Id.
136. As Steiner and Alston have asserted:
The non-binding diplomatic nature of tlhe Helsinki Process ... clearly played an
important role ... in legitimating human rights discourse within Eastern Europe,
providing a focus for nongovernmental activities at both the domestic and
international level, and developing standards in relation to democracy, the rule of
law, 'human contacts', national minorities and freedom of expression which went
beyond those already in existence in other contexts such as the Council of Europe
and the UN. To a large extent, its formally non-binding nature enabled the CSCE
standard-setting process to yield more detailed and innovative standards than those
adopted by its counterparts.
STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 87, at 792.
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Judicial enforcement mechanisms in the OSCE are sorely lacking.
There is no individual complaint procedure and there are no reporting
requirements.'37 Additionally, OSCE commitments do not apply directly
to States.
31
The most promising feature of the OSCE is the High Commissioner
on National Minorities (HCNM). The HCNM position was designed to
prevent conflict.'39 The High Commissioner decides whether to make on-
site visits to countries, and makes recommendations on short-term
policies toward minorities and long-term measures encouraging
interaction between a State and its minorities. 140 The mandate of the
HCNM reads:
The High Commissioner will provide "early warning" and, as
appropriate, "early action" at the earliest possible stage in regard
to tensions involving national minority issues which have not yet
developed beyond an early warning state, but, in the judgment of
the High Commissioner, have the potential to develop into a
conflict within the CSCE area, affecting peace, stability or
relations between participating States, requiring the attention of
and action by the Council [of Foreign Ministers] or the CSO
[Committee of Senior Officials].''
As the High Commissioner's mandate includes the promotion of
conflict prevention, the High Commissioner may directly engage
governments on minority rights issues.'4 2 The High Commissioner also
makes recommendations on government policy and programs.
4 3
The High Commissioner has the potential to be an effective actor in
the minority rights arena. However, the position's effectiveness is limited
by formal constraints on the High Commissioner's mandate and practical
constraints regarding limited resources.'" The mandate of the HCNM is
vague.43 The fundamental terms of the mandate-"early warning,"
"tensions," and "affecting peace, stability or relations"-remain
137. Wippman, supra note 16, at 615-16.
138. Rachel Brett, Human Rights and the OSCE, 18 HuM. RTS. Q. 668, 676 (1996).
139. Bloed & van Dijk, supra note 76, at 9.
140. STEINER &ALSTON, supra note 87, at 793.
141. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Declaration and Decisions
from Helsinki Summit, July 10, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1385.
142. The High Commissioner is to "provide 'early warning' and, as appropriate, 'early
action' in regard to tensions involving national minority issues" before they have "develop[ed]
into conflict[s] within the OSCE area, affecting peace, stability or relations between
participating States." Id.
143. Wippman, supra note 16, at 617.
144. Id. at 618.
145. Bloed & van Dijk, supra note 76, at 10.
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undefined, giving rise to a debate on formal powers.'46 Previous High
Commissioners have been able to further the OSCE's human rights
mandate using this vague language. 4 7 However, as a practical matter, the
lack of resources available to the High Commissioner has proven even
more problematic for implementation than the vague mandate.'
8
As evidenced above, the mandates of international organizations and
terms of international documents regarding the protection of minority
rights often overlap. This overlap may be positive if "competition speeds
up positive developments in the areas of standard-setting or supervision
of implementation of international norms."'4 9 However, there is also the
danger that "different institutions may adopt conflicting standards"' 50
Such a development would have a most negative effect on the protection
of national minorities. 5'
The action of international organizations is important in furthering
the development and protection of minority rights in Europe. However,
the existing minority protections are seen by many as weak and
ineffectual. Critics point to lack of implementation and enforcement
measures of minority rights mechanisms coupled with ineffective
nondiscrimination provisions as major weaknesses of international
instruments designed to protect minority rights.'52 The process of
international standard setting is often seen as insufficient for members of
a kin-State. The following Part examines the role of a kin-State in
promoting the rights of ethnic kin living in other countries.
V. KIN-STATE ACTION
"Kin-State," a relatively new term in international law is defined as
"a country in which significant political actors, usually representatives of
the state, have an avowed commitment to the well-being of citizens in
other states on the basis of perceived kinship. . . ." ' A kin-State is often
created by a "historical legacy in which co-ethnics long inhabited a
common, larger state structure that was eventually replaced by various
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 13.
150. Id. at 10.
151. Id.
152. See supra notes 147-49, 100-02.
153. Konrad Huber & Robert W. Mickey, Defining the Kin-State: An Analysis of Its Role
and Prescriptions for Moderating Its Impact, in PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS THROUGH
BILATERAL TREATIES: THE CASE OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 35, at 22-
24.
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new states.' 54 This process results in a "rump 'ethnic homeland' that
might later be fashioned into a kin-state." '
Kin-State actors often feel compelled to pursue various policies in
support of ethnic kin living in other States. Indeed, the 1990 Hungarian
Constitution includes a strong constitutional framework within which to
assure rights belonging to the Hatdron Tali Magyarok.56 Article 6 of the
Hungarian Constitution reflects the dedication of Hungary to the
Hungarians abroad: "[t]he Republic of Hungary feels itself responsible
towards all the Hungarians living outside the borders of the country, and
assists them in cultivating their relations with Hungary."'1
5 7
Support and assistance to co-ethnics usually assumes four forms: (1)
support directly provided to co-ethnic communities in their home
State(s); (2) resettlement assistance offered to co-ethnics wishing to
relocate from their State of residence, often to the kin-State itself;
(3) bilateral contacts with home-State officials regarding the condition of
the minority; and (4) international initiatives aimed at resolving the
minority's alleged predicament.' 58 This Section examines the options kin-
States face in addressing concern for their co-ethnics-specifically
domestic legislation and bilateral agreements. '
A. Direct Support to Co-Ethnics: The Hungarian Status Law
Kin-State legislation is not a new phenomenon. European States
such as Slovakia, Russia, and Italy have passed legislation conferring
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. REP. HUNG. CONST. art. 6. Hatdron Ttili Magyarok means "Hungarians abroad" in
English. See supra note 51.
157. REP. HUNG. CONST. art. 6(3). Hungary is not the only country to constitutionally
provide for this type of minority support. The Romanian Constitution provides: "The State
shall support the strengthening of links with the Romanians living abroad and shall act
accordingly for the preservation development and expression of their ethnic, cultural,
linguistic, and religious identity under observance of the legislation of the State of which they
are citizens'" ROM. CONST. art. 7. The Slovenian Constitution reads, "[The government of
Slovenia] shall attend to the welfare of the Slovenian minorities in neighboring countries and
of Slovenian emigrants and migrant workers abroad and shall promote their contacts with their
homeland" SLOVN. CONST. art. 5(l).
158. PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS THROUGH BILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 35,
at 32-33.
159. This Note does not examine resettlement assistance offered to co-ethnics wishing to
locate from their State of residence to the kin-State or international initiatives aimed at
resolving the minority's alleged predicament. The Hungarian Status Law is "designed to
mitigate the risk of a wave of migration of ethnic Hungarians from poorer countries in the
region once Hungary joins the European Union." Tomos Packer, Hungary-Prime Minister
Fails to Reach Agreement with Slovakia over Hungarian Status Law, WMRC DAILY
ANALYSIS, Nov. 28, 2002, available at 2002 WL 104063946. The only international initiatives
aimed specifically at the Hungarian minority take the form of bilateral agreements between
Hungary and its neighboring countries, discussed in Section VB, infra.
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preferential treatment to their kin-minorities. 60 However, the Status Law
is unique among the Status Laws of Eastern Europe in that it is
legislation enacted domestically in favor of granting benefits to the kin
minority abroad.
6
1
The aims of the conservative Orbdn government in ushering in the
Status Law are disputable.6 The official aim of the Status Law is the
160. The texts of these laws are not available in English. See Act on Expatriate Slovaks
and Changing and Complementing Some Law, No. 70, Feb. 14, 1997, cited in Venice Comm'n
Rep., supra note 4; Law Regarding the Support Granted to the Romanian Communities from
All over the World, July 15, 1998, cited in Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4; Federal Law on
the State Policy of the Russian Federation in Respect of the Compatriots Abroad, Mar. 1999,
cited in Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4; Law for the Bulgarians Living Outside the
Republic of Bulgaria, Apr. 11, 2000, cited in Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4; Law in Favor
of the Italian Minority in Slovenia and Croatia, No. 73, Mar. 2001, cited in Venice Comm'n
Rep., supra note 4.
161. Cf Eur. Comm'n for Democracy Through Law, Paper Containing the Position of
the Hungarian Government in Relation to the Act on Hungarians Living in Neighboring
Countries para. 3.9, Aug. 21, 2001, in Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4. In this position
paper, the Hungarian government recognizes that "differences exist between the Hungarian
Act and the law and practices of these other states," however, it asserts that ". . . it seems to be
an accepted kin-State practice to legislate domestically in favor of granting certain benefits to
the kin minority living abroad." Id. The Venice Commission Report rejected this assertion that
kin-State legislation has reached the status of customary international law, stating, "The
adoption by States of unilateral measures granting benefits to the persons belonging to their
kin-minorities, . . . in the Commission's opinion does not have sufficient diuturnitas to have
become an international custom .... See Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4.
162. See Packer, supra note 159 (The Hungarian government claims "the law is designed
to mitigate the risk of a wave of migration of ethnic Hungarians from poorer countries in the
region once Hungary joins the European Union."); Hungarian Foreign Minister Jdnos
Martonyi, Statement on Reactions from Neighboring Countries to the Adoption of the Law on
Hungarians Living in the Neighboring Countries by the Hungarian Parliament, Budapest (June
20, 2001) ("By adopting and supporting this Law, Hungary and the Hungarians living in the
neighboring countries clearly expressed their firm intention to promote the realization of our
common objectives of a unified Europe of the 21st century...."); Hungarian Foreign Minister
Jinos Martonyi, Statement on Reactions from Neighboring Countries to the Adoption of the
Law on Hungarians Living in the Neighboring Countries by the Hungarian Parliament,
Budapest (June 22, 2001) ("[Tlhe prosperity and the preservation of the distinct identity of
minorities in our region serve the development of the entire region, and the promotion of
good-neighborly relations between the countries in our region. Therefore, any support
provided to minorities will inevitably serve these objectives."); Purvis, supra note 47.
Gheorghe Funar, Mayor of Cluj-Napoca, an historically Hungarian town, now located in
Romania declared, "[t]his law is part of an attempt to reclaim old territories... " The Status
Law has also been linked to labor. See Controversial Status Law Accepted, 15 Bus. HUNG.
(July 2001), http://www.amcham.hu/BusinessHungary/ 15-07/articles/15-07_06.asp. The
article states:
,Among the most critical points of the law is the question of special work permits
granted to Hungarians living in neighboring states. The attacks came partially after
both Prime Minister Viktor Orb6.n and Economic Minister Gy6rgy Matolcsy
declared on various occasions that the country will be facing serious labor shortages
within a few years and a possibility to resolve this problem would be via the
available Hungarian labor population abroad.
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facilitation of a smooth transition for Hungary into the European Union
in 2004 by discouraging mass emigration to Hungary after accession.
161
Passage of the Status Law is viewed as symbolic by many ethnic
Hungarians living abroad.' 6" While the Status Law passed with an
overwhelming majority, Hungarian politicians no longer rally around the
law, and reaction outside of Parliament has been less than positive.'
65
Hungarian journalists and citizens alike have attacked the law while both
Romania and Slovakia contend that the Status Law violates international
law.'6
The Status Law applies to ethnic Hungarians living in the countries
of Slovakia, the Ukraine, Romania, Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Slovenia.
67
Provisions of the Status Law allow Hungarian minorities in these
countries to receive an annual three month work permit in Hungary.68
The Hungarian minorities are also entitled to medical insurance and
pension benefits.' 69 Students are eligible for scholarships to Hungarian
higher-education institutions'70 and ethnic Hungarians have access to
travel discounts to and from Hungary. 7' Under the law, Hungarian
Id.; Eugen Tomiuc, Hungary: Status Law Causing Dispute with Neighbors, RFE/RL
NEWSLINE Oct. 4, 2001 ("Critics of the law accuse Budapest of using the legislation to pre-
empt massive waves of immigration while at the same time tapping into the labor resources of
the neighboring countries."). However, the World Press Review cites the Hungarian newspaper
Magyar Hirlap as commenting that "[piarty affiliation is the basic criterion for opinion on the
Status Law." David Koch, Status Symbols, 49 WORLD PRESS REV. (Apr. 2002),
http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/443.cfm (quoting Peter Erdelyi, Feb. 11, 2002).
163. Daniela Spinant, Hungary to Help Hungarians from Outside, EUOBSERVER.COM,
Apr. 20, 2001, at http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=2062 ("Almost one quarter of
the three million ethnic Hungarians living abroad intend to leave their country of residence
and go to Hungary when it joins the EU.").
164. See Michael Stewart, The Hungarian Status Law: A New European Form of
Transnational Politics?, in HUNSOR HIFRUTAR 21 (Jan. 6, Subj. 3) (recounting a report from
Serbian Vojvodina of an old man in line to apply for the Hungarian identity card who told
those around him, "I've waited sixty years for this moment when I can carry an official
Hungarian document over my heart.").
165. Koch, supra note 162.
166. Id. ("The reaction of Hungary's press to the law has been generally negative.
Regarding negotiations with Romania, Imre Bednarik wrote: 'Only two people were happy'
about the law-'Corneliu Vadim Tudor [leader of the Greater Romanian Party] and
[Hungarian Prime Minister] Viktor Orbin, and we know the former to be anti-Hungarian'
(N6pszabadsig, Jan. 5)"); Rom. Gov't Declaration, supra note 3 ("The Law in its entirety has
a discriminatory character, in contradiction with the international documents applicable in the
field of minorities.")
167. See Hungarian Status Law, supra note 1, arts. 1(1), 21(3). The Status Law requires
that persons must have lost their Hungarian citizenship for reasons other than voluntary
renunciation. In addition, they may not be in possession of a permanent residence permit for
Hungary. Id.
168. See id. art. 15.
169. See id. aft. 7.
170. See id. arts. 6, 9.
171. Id. art. 8.
[Vol. 24:961
The Act on Hungarians Living Abroad
teachers may receive training in Hungary, while Budapest supports the
development of Hungarian culture and higher education outside its
borders.172 Following this logic, the law allots an $80 annual allowance to
ethnic Hungarian families living outside of Hungary if they have at least
two children who attend a Hungarian-language school.1
73
B. Bilateral Contacts with Home State
Following its mandate in the Hungarian Constitution to assist the
Hatdron Tali Magyarok, the Hungarian government has entered into
bilateral agreements on friendly relations with its neighbors concerning
the minority." This bilateral approach has proved to be an effective
measure of minority protection.
The bilateral agreement mechanism is endorsed by the general
principles of international law.7 1 In bilateral agreements, a kin-State is
able to extend and tailor international obligations relating to minorities
beyond what can be achieved on a multilateral basis. 76 In Central Eastern
Europe, kin-States sharing minority problems and interests have entered
into bilateral agreements concerning them. 7' States in this type of an
agreement agree to protect national minorities in their State in exchange
for the same protection being offered to ethnic kin in the other State.
7 1
Bilateral treaties provide certain "classic" rights, rights such as the right
172. See id. art. 11.
173. See id. art. 14.
174. Treaty on the Foundations of Good-Neighborliness and Co-operation Between the
Republic of Hungary and Ukraine, Dec. 6, 1991, reprinted in PROTECTION OF MINORITY
RIGHTS THROUGH BILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 35, at 392 [hereinafter Hungary-Ukraine
Treaty]; Treaty Between the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Croatia on Friendly
Relations and Cooperation, Dec. 16, 1992, reprinted in PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS
THROUGH BILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 35, at 339 [hereinafter Hungary-Croatia Treaty];
Treaty on the Foundations of Friendly Relations and Co-operation Between the Republic of
Hungary and the Republic of Estonia, Aug. 8, 1992, reprinted in PROTECTION OF MINORITY
RIGHTS THROUGH BILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 35, at 341; Treaty on Friendly Co-
operation and Partnership in Europe Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Republic of Hungary, Feb. 6, 1992, reprinted in PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS THROUGH
BILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 35, at 350.
175. See generally Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4; see also Eur. Comm'n for
Democracy Through Law (Venice Comm'n), LAW & FOREIGN POL'Y COLLECTION, Science
and Technique of Democracy, No. 24, para. 14 ("[I]n their mutual relations, States shall act in
accordance with the principles and rules, of friendly neighborly relations which must guide
their action at [the] international level, particularly in the local and regional context.");
Framework Convention, supra note 50.
176. Wippman, supra note 16, at 619.
177. See, e.g., Hungary-Ukraine Treaty, supra note 174; Hungary-Croatia Treaty, supra
note 174.
178. Wippman, supra note 16.
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to identity, linguistic rights, cultural rights, education rights, and freedom
of religion. 179
Oftentimes, these agreements refer to preexisting bilateral
instruments specifically concerning minorities.80 For example, The
Cooperation Treaty Between Hungary and Slovenia follows the
Convention on Providing Special Rights for the Slovenian Minority
Living in the Republic of Hungary and for the Hungary Minority Living
in the Republic of Slovenia of November 1992."'8
The birth of the Framework Convention has affected the substance of
subsequent bilateral treaties.12  The Hungary-Romania Treaty on
Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighborliness"3 was concluded
after the Framework Convention and closely follows the Framework's
wording. 4 The Treaty on Good-Neighborly Relations and Friendly
Cooperation between Hungary and Slovakia follows and elaborates the
formulas of the Framework Convention.'85 The Treaty took the elastic
and programmatory provisions of the Framework Convention and
formulated them more strictly.'86 Conversely, the Treaty between
Hungary and Croatia, concluded in April 1996, though written after the
Framework Convention, does not reflect the programs of the Convention,
but the pro-autonomy attitude of both Croatia and Hungary.'87
While the implementation of these treaties and agreements involve
respecting the terms of the instrument and the pursuit of bilateral talks,
the implementation is not subject to legal control.'88 One method of
179. See Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4.
180. Id.
181. See also Hungary-Ukraine Treaty, supra note 174. This treaty follows the
framework and adopts the terms of The Declaration on the Principles of Co-operation
Between the Republic of Hungary and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in
Guaranteeing the Rights of National Minorities of Hungary, May 31, 1991, reprinted in
PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS THROUGH BILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 35, at 386.
The Hungary-Croatia Treaty, supra note 174, was complemented by the Agreement between
the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Croatia on the Protection of the Hungarian
Minority in the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Minority in the Republic of Hungary,
Apr. 5, 1995, reprinted in PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS THROUGH BILATERAL TREATIES,
supra note 35, at 341. In addition, an agreement regarding minorities may follow the creation
of a bilateral treaty.
182. KovAcs, supra note 98, at 102, 106 ("The style of the formulation of the given
bilateral treaty depends on the one hand on the openness of the states and on the other hand on
situation ratione temporis (birth) viz. the Framework convention. The approach should be kept
in mind when a bilateral treaty concluded by Hungary is being examined.")
183. Treaty On Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighborliness (Hung.-Rom.), 36
I.L.M. 340 (1997) [hereinafter Hungary-Romania Treaty].
184. Kovics, supra note 98, at 107.
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 106.
188. See Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4.
[Vol. 24:961
The Act on Hungarians Living Abroad
enforcing the terms of a bilateral treaty is State application to the
International Conciliation and Arbitration Court (ICAC) for the solution
to a dispute or for the interpretation of a provision of the agreement in
question.189 However, no State has as yet taken this step." In addition,
the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities may be called
upon to resolve a dispute.'9' As with the ICAC, no State has requested
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities intervention.'92
Therefore, the only tool to enforce compliance with a bilateral agreement
is political pressure from one party or the international community.' 93
The precise aims of governments concluding these treaties are often
in tension with each other. One party may simply desire to repeat
existing multilateral commitments in a bilateral agreement while another
may desire to codify a progressive development.'9 This tension was
evidenced in the context of bilateral agreements between Hungary and
its neighbors, Slovakia and Romania, in which Kovdcs contends that "the
Slovak and the Romanian governments were ready to repeat the items
already covered by the Framework convention" while "[t]he Hungarian
government wanted to deepen the protection by the stipulation of
additional or more precise clauses."' 95
Political pressure is a strong motivational force for States to enter
into bilateral agreements with each other. 96 After the collapse of
communism in Central Eastern Europe, former communist countries
desired membership in the European Union and NATO. Legitimately
concerned about minority tension within the EU and NATO, the
organizations strongly encouraged the creation of bilateral treaties
among former communist countries. 97 International oversight of the
189. Pact on Stability in Europe art. 16, Paris, Mar. 20-21, 1995, reprinted in FLORENCE
BENoiT-ROHMER, THE MINORITY QUESTION IN EUROPE: TEXTS AND COMMENTARY app. 4
(Council of Eur. Publ'g 1996) ("The States party to the Convention establishing the
International Conciliation and Arbitration Court may refer to the Court possible disputes
concerning the interpretation or implementation of their good-neighborliness agreements.")
The ICAC is an OSCE organ. It was established in 1992 pursuant to the Convention on
Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE. Court of Conciliation and Arbitration
Homepage, at http://www.osce.org/cca/ (last visited June 9, 2003).
190. Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4.
191. See Pact on Stability in Europe, supra note 189, Final Decl. art. 15.
192. Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4.
193. While no formal procedure exists to enforce the implementation of bilateral
agreements, refusal to do so violates the general principle of international law as stated in
article 2 of the Framework Convention, that "in their mutual relations, States shall act in
accordance with the principles and rules of friendly neighborly relations which must guide
their action at international level, particularly in the local and regional context." Id.
194. KovAcs, supra note 98, at 105.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 102-18.
197. Id. at 104.
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bilateral treaties was limited and legal considerations were overlooked
by Member States of NATO and the EU.'98 Kov.cs contends that "the
pure existence of a bilateral treaty on borders and minority protection
was claimed very loudly as a 'price' of the 'entrance ticket'."' 9  One
example cited as disregard of the legal nature of the document is the
Hungary-Romania Treaty:
The content of the treaty, the lack of a settlement mechanism in
case of potential interpretation disputes, the problem of
coherence with other European documents (especially that of the
Venice Commission on recommendation 1201) were manifestly
neglected in the capitals of member countries of the EU and the
NATO. The welcoming telegrams arrived-as this is in fashion
today when the partners would like to give a political lift and an
empty lip service to government-witnessing the manifest lack
of knowledge concerning the content)°°
Despite these drawbacks, bilateral agreements are popular among the
countries of Eastern Europe. Hungary has entered into bilateral
agreements with Slovakia, Romania, and Croatia, to name a few.20 These
agreements, as mentioned above, have focused on the treatment of
minorities living abroad. Despite the number of international
agreements-universal and regional-as well as the number of bilateral
agreements securing the protection of the Hungarian minority, the
Hungarian Parliament, in June 2001, passed a domestic measure
198. Id.
199. Id. at 104.
200. KovAcs, supra note 98, at 108. Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe was initially intended to be an additional protocol to the
European Convention on Human Rights. Article II of Recommendation 1201 provides for
autonomy of minorities. The Venice Commission declared that there is neither a recognized
right of special status for minorities nor a common practice of such rights, and that it would be
impossible for international law to impose any territorial solution for minorities. Thus,
Recommendation 1201 has not been adopted by the Council of Europe. However, both the
Hungary-Slovakia Treaty of 1995 and the Hungary-Romania Treaty of 1996 make reference to
Recommendation 1201. Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation
Between the Republic of Hungary and the Slovak Republic, Mar. 19, 1995 (Text of treaty
unavailable in English); Hungary-Romania Treaty, supra note 183. In addition, Hungarian
minorities often cite it in their case for autonomy. Recommendation 1201(1993) on an
Additional Protocol on the Rights of National Minorities to the Eureopean Convention
on Human Rights, available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdtoptedText/TA93/
ERECI20I.HTM. See BENO'T-ROHMER, supra note 189, at 36-38, for a complete discussion
on Recommendation 1201.
201. See, e.g., Hungary-Ukraine Treaty, supra note 174; Hungary-Croatia Treaty, supra
note 174; Hungary-Romania Treaty, supra note 183.
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applicable to the status of the Hungarians living abroad-the Hungarian
Status Law. °2
VI. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE HUNGARIAN STATUS LAW
Though kin-States throughout Central Eastern Europe have passed
status laws addressing cultural educational and linguistic assistance, even
the most benign status laws are often viewed in a highly political light.03
A status law is viewed as a "direct challenge to the home-state's policies
in these spheres ... [and] strikes at the heart of insecurities within the
home-state."2 This has been true for the Hungarian Status Law.
Romania, one objecting State, in addition to attacking the law politically,
challenged the facial legality of the Hungarian Status Law.
Upon a Romanian request to examine the compatibility of the Status
Law with European Standards and public international law, the Council
of Europe's Venice Commission found that the Status Law failed to
comply with the following principles of international law:
1. The territorial sovereignty of States;
2. The principle of pacta sunt servanda;°5
3. Prohibition of discrimination (preferential treatment by kin-
State shall be limited to education and culture).3°
The following Section will examine the Hungarian Status Law in
light of the principles of the territorial sovereignty of States and the
prohibition of discrimination.' °7
A. Extraterritorial Effect of the Status Law
The provisions of the Hungarian Status Law have caused great
consternation in Hungary's neighbors, the Council of Europe, and the
202. Hungarian Status Law, supra note 1.
203. PROTECTIONS OF MINORITY RIGHTS THROUGH BILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 35,
at 34.
204. Id.
205. Pacta sunt servanda is the principle of good faith enshrined in article 26 of the
Vienna Convention: "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith." See Principles of International Treaty Law, available at
http://www.walter.gehr.net/servanda.html (last visited June 9, 2003); Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in T.O. ELIAS, THE MODERN
LAW OF TREATIES 225 (1974) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
206. Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4.
207. See Section IXA, infra, for a discussion of the principle of pacta sunt servanda
with specific reference to bilateral treaties.
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European Union."8 Within Hungary, the law's effect on foreign citizens
is undeniable. However, it is the effect of the Status Law on foreign
citizens outside Hungary that is determinative of the Status Law's
legality. The following Subsections explore the applicability of the Status
Law outside of Hungary and analyze the legality of the law's reach.
The initial question regarding the legality of the Status Law is
whether the Hungarian government has the jurisdiction to enact it. The
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law discusses the reach of domestic
law and the authority of States to prescribe their law in a transnational
contextc 9 Under international law, a State may have authority to exercise
jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction to adjudicate, and jurisdiction to
enforce."" Jurisdiction to prescribe is the power of a nation to make a
rule binding on persons, transactions, and relationships that have some
connection with the regulating State.2"' This Section analyzes whether
Hungary is jurisdictionally competent to enact the Status Law."2
Jurisdiction is based on territoriality, nationality, and the protection of
a State.2 3 It is a well-settled principle of international law that States enjoy
territorial sovereignty.214 This gives a State the right to regulate conduct
and persons within its territory."5 Thus, Hungary is jurisdictionally
competent to prescribe laws which apply to non-Hungarians while they are
in Hungary. The fact that the Status Law addresses foreign citizens does
not alone constitute an infringement of territorial sovereignty.26 A State
may issue laws concerning foreign citizens "as long as the effects of [the]
laws ... take place within its borders only."2 7 The Status Law, insofar as it
208. See, e.g., Mihaela Gherghisan, Hungary and Slovakia Continue Talks on Status
Law, EUOBSERVER.COM, Feb. 28, 2003, at http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=9524;
Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4; Tomiuc, supra note 162; Controversial Status Law
Accepted, supra note 162.
209. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 401-416 (1987).
210. Id. § 401. This authority is subject to certain limitations. Id.
211. Id. § 401(a).
212. A State may exercise the "jurisdiction to adjudicate, i.e., to subject persons or things
to the process of its courts or administrative tribunals, whether in civil or in criminal
proceedings, and whether or not the state is a party to the proceedings; [and] jurisdiction to
enforce, i.e., to induce or compel compliance or punish noncompliance with its laws or
regulations, whether through the courts or by use of executive, administrative, police, or other
non-judicial action." Id. § 401(2)-(3). I will only address the jurisdiction to prescribe as it
speaks to a "state's authority to subject foreign interests or activities to its laws." Id. cmt. a.
213. Id. § 402.
214. This principle has been codified in the Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities which states that no State has the right to "engage in any activity or
perform any act contrary to ... territorial integrity." Framework Convention, supra note 50,
art. 21.
215. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(l)(a)-(b).
216. Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4.
217. Id.
[Vol. 24:961
The Act on Hungarians Living Abroad
has effect within the borders of Hungary, does not violate principles of
international law.
Many provisions of the Status Law apply exclusively within the
borders of Hungary. For instance ethnic Hungarians are entitled to rights
identical to those of Hungarian citizens while in Hungary. 28 Eligible
ethnic Hungarians may receive funding from the Hungarian State to
attend higher education institutions in Hungary.2 9 They may also be
granted a work permit for employment within Hungary, and Hungarians
teaching Hungarian abroad' are eligible for teacher training in
Budapest.22° Lastly, the Status Law grants monetary benefits to ethnic
Hungarian students, teachers, and pensioners living abroad equal to those
of Hungarian nationals. 22' These benefits are available only when the
beneficiaries are within the territory of Hungary, thus conforming to
the principle of jurisdiction based on territoriality.
The jurisdiction a State may exercise over people and activities in its
territory is not exclusive to that State alone.23 Rather, the persons and
activities in one State may be subject to the jurisdiction of another. The
Restatement provides that a State has jurisdiction to prescribe law with
respect to conduct outside of its territory.2 ' Such prescription is limited,
however, to "conduct ... which has or is intended to have substantial
effect within its territory. 225 To the extent that the Status Law regulates
conduct outside of Hungary which has or is intended to have substantial
effects within Hungary, it is justified under general principles of
international law. 226 However, as this Section demonstrates, the conduct
outside of Hungary regulated by the Status Law does not have
substantial effects within Hungary.
The Status Law applies extraterritorially in the realm of educational
assistance to ethnic Hungarians in their home State. 27 One method of
promoting Hungarian culture in the neighboring countries is through the
support of Hungarian higher education institutions in those countries.28
Pursuant to the Hungarian Status Law, eligible ethnic Hungarians may
apply to the Hungarian government for monetary assistance in higher
218. Hungarian Status Law, supra note 1, art. 4. Such rights include the right to use
public cultural institutions, and free use of public libraries and museums. Id.
219. Id. art. 9.
220. Id. art. 15.
221. Id. arts. 7, 8, 10, 11, 12.
222. Id. art. 23.
223. Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4.
224. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 402(1)(c), 402(3).
225. Id. § 402(1)(c).
226. Id. § 402(1)(c).
227. Hungarian Status Law, supra note 1, art. 14.
228. Id. art. 13.
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education instruction affiliated with Hungarian culture in neighboring
countries. 29 The grant of educational assistance outside of Hungarian
borders is not in and of itself a violation of international law.
International law allows a State to cultivate its culture outside its borders
by promoting the study of "its language or languages, history and
civilization in the territory of the other Contracting Parties and grant
facilities to the nationals of those Parties to pursue such studies in its
territories., 230 However, assistance to foreign citizens is not authorized
when not tailored to the study of the kin-State.23' The Status Law
specifically targets parents of ethnic Hungarian children attending a
Hungarian school in a neighboring country.3 Parents raising at least two
children attending a qualified school may receive monetary assistance
for books and other learning materials.233 This assistance is received from
the Hungarian government via the public benefit organization established
for this purpose.3 While the education is conducted in Hungarian, this
provision of the Status Law does not necessarily promote the study of
Hungary.
The education of school age children in the countries bordering
Hungary does not have, nor is it intended to have substantial effect
within the territory of Hungary.233 There is a psychological effect on
Hungarian nationals knowing that their "brothers and sisters" abroad are
not being deprived of their Hungarian culture. 6 Hungarian nationals
may receive peace of mind, but such a psychological effect is not
229. Id.
230. See Cultural Convention, Euorp T.S., No. 018, Dec. 19, 1954, art. 2, § 2.
231. Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4.
232. Hungarian Status Law, supra note 1, art. 14.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(1)(c).
236. Kin-State electorates are less interested in the fate of co-ethnics abroad than most
politicians realize. PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS THROUGH BILATERAL TREATIES, supra
note 35, at 28. More than one-half of ethnic Russians in Moscow are indifferent to the
problems of their co-ethnics living abroad. Id. (internal citation omitted). Hungarians are
divided on the issue of the "other Hungarians." E-mail from Anonymous, to Christin J.
Albertie (Jan. 14, 2003, 18:18 EST) (on file with author). Many Hungarian nationals do not
see ethnic Hungarians as "Hungarians beyond the borders." Rather, many refer to ethnic
Hungarians abroad as Serbs, Croats, and Romanians. The wave of ethnic Hungarians fleeing
from Transylvania to Budapest in the 1980s prompted anti-Transylvanianism in Hungary. In
addition, ethnic Hungarians from the Croatian village of Vorosmart, Croatia have had negative
experiences in Hungary. E-mail from Anonymous, to Christin J. Albertie (Jan. 5, 2003, 03:17
EST) (on file with author). On the other hand, other Hungarians think that the question of
Hungarians living abroad is important. Szabolcs Parragh, Literary Historian, emphasizes
solidarity with the Hungarians abroad. Though the Hungarian Status Law has little effect on
his life, he states he is happy to "pay the price" of the Status Law in Hungary. Such "price"
may mean more employment competition or higher taxes. E-mail from Szabolcs Parragh,
Literary Historian, to Christin J. Albertie (Mar. 21, 2003, 06:23 EST) (on file with author).
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"substantial" within the meaning of the Restatement.237 For example,
"substantial effects" may refer to liability for injury from products made
outside of the State exercising jurisdiction but which have been
introduced into its commerce, and the imposing of liability for violation
of economic regulatory laws on the basis of its economic effect in the
territory.238 The education environment provided to ethnic Hungarians in
neighboring countries does not have a "substantial effect" in Hungary
that would justify the Status Law.
States have jurisdiction to legislate with respect to the activities of
their nationals outside of their territory.2 39 However, the Status Law does
not address the activities of Hungarian nationals; foreign citizens are the
object of the law.240 The Status Law provides for the Hungarian
government to establish "public benefit organization(s) in order to
evaluate the application of and distribute assistance for persons
(organizations)., 241 These organizations shall be governed by Hungarian
law on public benefit organizations though they operate in countries
outside of Hungary. 242 Thus, the Status Law provides for the government
to create an organization which will channel government money from the
Hungarian government to foreign citizens, albeit ethnic Hungarians.
Lastly, a State may enact a law with respect to conduct outside its
territory by non-nationals directed against the security of the State.243 The
latter "protective" principle grants States the right to punish a small class
of crimes committed outside its territory by non-nationals which are
directed against State interests.2" Such State interests include the
counterfeiting of the State's currency, the falsification of official
documents, and the violation of customs laws.245 Clearly, the conduct
regulated by the Status Law does not fall within this category.
1. Education Benefits
The opponents to the Status Law argue that the law has a "clear
extraterritorial effect. 246 EU Commissioner for Enlargement of the
237. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402, cmt. d.
238. Id.
239. Id. § 402(2).
240. Hungarian Status Law, supra note I. ("This Act shall apply to persons declaring
themselves to be of Hungarian nationality who are not Hungarian citizens and who have their
residence in the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Romania, the
Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic or the Ukraine."). Id. art. 1.
241. Id. art. 24(l).
242. Id. art. 24(2).
243. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(3).
244. Id. cmt. f.
245. Id.
246. Verheugen, supra note 5.
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European Union Gunter Verheugen stresses that educational assistance
directly supporting individuals and organizations of accredited
Hungarian higher education institutions in neighboring countries has an
extraterritorial effect. 47 "Assistance in the area of education that will be
provided as direct support to establishments and organizations of
accredited Hungarian higher education institutions in neighboring
countries needs the formal consent of the Home-State."24 8
Due to the alleged extraterritorial effect of the educational
assistance, Verheugen echoes the concerns of the Venice Commission,
stating that the educational provisions of the Hungarian Status Law
could interfere with the educational policies of the home State.24 9 Thus,
to ensure legality of the provisions, Hungary must receive explicit
consent from the affected States.25°
Consent from affected States could be expressed in a bilateral
agreement or in a body similar to the Slovak-Hungarian Joint
Commission. The Joint Commission meets to address questions
concerning "the identity of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, its
development, culture and education. 25' Such a forum is easily accessible
to both parties. However, Hungary has not been amenable to this and
similar forums.252
2. Promotion of Noncultural Goals
The Hungarian Status Law provides that it will offer assistance to
Hungarian organizations operating abroad. 23 To receive support, the
mission or the organization must adhere to certain goals which provide
specified benefits to ethnic Hungarians.254 Benefits granted by the Status
Law are either related to culture and education or to other goals.255
247. Id.
248. Id. This concern also addresses that of the Venice Commission. The Venice
Commission's Report stated that when States legislate outside their territory on issues not
covered by treaties or international custom, the consent of the home States affected by the
measures of the kin-State should be explicit.
249. Id. Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4.
250. Verheugen, supra note 5.
251. Slovakia Urges Mixed Slovak-Hungarian Body to Discuss Status Law, BBC
MONITORING, Jan. 15, 2003, available at 2003 WL 9190178.
252. ld.; see also Rom. Gov't Declaration, supra note 3.
253. Hungarian Status Law, supra note 1, art. 18.
254. Id. art. 18(2).
255. Benefits relating to culture and education include "the preservation, furtherance and
research of Hungarian national traditions; the preservation and fostering of the Hungarian
language, literature, culture, and folk arts; the promotion of higher education of Hungarians
living abroad by facilitating the work of instructors from Hungary as visiting lecturers; and the
restoration and maintenance of monuments belonging to the Hungarian cultural heritage...."
Id. art. 18(2)(a)-(d). Other benefits include "the enhancement of the capacity of disadvantaged
settlements in areas inhabited by Hungarian national communities living abroad to improve
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These goals include the "preservation, furtherance and research of
Hungarian national traditions" and the "preservation and fostering of the
Hungarian language, literature, culture and folk arts. 256 These goals,
insofar as they cultivate Hungarian culture, fall within acceptable bounds
of international law.257 The aim to foster cultural links of the targeted
population with the kin-State is justified despite the fact that it results in
differential treatment of ethnic minorities and the nationals of that
State. 258 However, these preferences must be proportionately and
genuinely linked to the culture of the kin-State.259
Other goals which the Status Law mandates for Hungarian
organizations operating abroad relate more to economic advancement of
ethnic Hungarians than the advancement of culture or language.26 These
goals include the "enhancement of the capacity of disadvantaged
settlements in areas inhabited by Hungarian national communities living
abroad to improve their ability to preserve their population and to
develop rural tourism.
261
The preservation of the ethnic Hungarian population outside of
Hungary and the development of the local economies of other States via
the encouragement of rural tourism falls outside the scope of legally
acceptable goals of the Hungarian government. Preferential treatment
outside the sphere of education and culture may be granted in
"exceptional" cases. 62 Where the genuine aim is to maintain links with
kin-States and the methods to obtain that aim are proportional, this
preferential treatment is acceptable. 6 ' The Venice Commission provides
an example of such an aim: "when the preference concerns access to
benefits which are at any rate available to other foreign citizens who do
their ability to preserve their population and to develop rural tourism; the establishment and
improvement of conditions of infrastructure for maintaining contacts with the Republic of
Hungary." Id. art. 18(2)(e)-(f).
256. Id. art. 18(2)(a)-(b).
257. See Cultural Convention, supra note 232, art. 2, § 2.
258. Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4. For instance, the fostering of cultural links
between Hungarian nationals and ethnic Hungarians living in the Slovak Republic as citizens
of the Slovak Republic results in differential treatment between the members of the Hungarian
minority and the Slovak nationals. Members of the Hungarian minority are eligible for
benefits which are denied to ethnic Slovaks.
259. Id. ("In fields other than education and culture, the Commission considers that
preferential treatment might be granted ... when it is shown to pursue the genuine aim of
maintaining the links with the kin-States and to be proportionate to that aim......
260. Hungarian Status Law, supra note 1, art. 18
261. Id.
262. Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4 ("In fields other than education and culture, the
Commission considers that preferential treatment might be granted only in exceptional cases
... .)
263. Id.
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not have the national background of the kin-State.'' 264 The enhancement
of the economic capacity of disadvantaged Hungarian communities
abroad and the development by the Hungarian government of tourism in
regions composed predominately of ethnic Hungarians aims to benefit
only Hungarian communities. The extent to which benefits are bestowed
on non-ethnic Hungarians is irrelevant to the Hungarian government.
A State may not promote the economic status of foreign citizens
abroad.26 ' Article 18 of the Status Law steps beyond the bounds of
cultural and educational goals.266 Economic activities, such as the
maintenance of population and the promotion of tourism do not "pursue
the genuine aim of maintaining the links with the kin-States. 267 As such,
they have no place in the Hungarian Status Law.268
B. Prohibition of Discrimination
The principle of nondiscrimination, a basic tenet of international law,
is embedded in numerous international documents.26 9 The simple fact that
Hungary's Status Law confers preferential treatment on individuals
based on their ethnicity threatens to violate this principle.
The preeminent document on minority rights and protection, the
Framework Convention, provides that "any discrimination based on
belonging to a national minority shall be prohibited. 70 Furthermore, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,27' the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights2 2 and the European Convention on Human
Rights 73-each of which Hungary is a signatory to-all contain a
nondiscrimination provision. 4
264. Id.
265. See id.
266. Hungarian Status Law, supra note 1, art. 18.
267. Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4.
268. Verheugen, supra note 5 ("Economic activities as these foreseen under article 18(e)
of the law aiming at assisting disadvantaged settlements and rural tourism should remain
outside the scope of the law.").
269. See, e.g., Framework Convention, supra note 50, art. 4.
270. Id.
271. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 23, art. 7 ("All are equal before
the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.").
272. ICCPR, supra note 53, art. 26 ("[T]he law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground
such as race, color, sex, language, religion ... national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.")
273. ECHR, supra note 92, art. 14. ("The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth
in the Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race,
color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth, or other status.").
274. Hungary ratified the ICCPR on January 17, 1974. Status of Ratifications of the
Principal International Rights Treaties as of 09 December 2002, available at
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The Hungarian Status Law is subject to a nondiscrimination analysis
because:
The legislation and regulations ... aim at conferring a
preferential treatment to certain individuals, i.e. foreign citizens
with a specific national background. They thus create a
difference in treatment (between these individuals and the
citizens of the kin-State; between them and the other citizens of
the home-State; between them and foreigners belonging to other
minorities), which could constitute discrimination-based on
essentially ethnic reasons-and be in breach of the principle of
,,275non-discrimination ....
Thus, the fact that the Hungarian Status Law bases receipt of the
law's benefits on national ethnicity may breach the principle of
nondiscrimination.276 However, preference does not always constitute
discrimination. The fact that "part of the population is given a less
favorable treatment on the basis of their not belonging to a specific
ethnic group is not, of itself, discriminatory, nor contrary to the
principles of international law.' 277 The Framework Convention obliges
parties to adopt measures to promote equality between persons
belonging to a national minority and those belonging to the majority in
all areas of "economic, social, political and cultural life." '278 Though
States may give one class of citizens preferential treatment to achieve
"full and effective equality," the Framework Convention explicitly states
that these measures shall not be considered to be an act of
discrimination.279
Preferential treatment does not violate the principle of
nondiscrimination when a legitimate aim is pursued and the means
employed to obtain it are proportionate to that goal.280 The principle of
nondiscrimination is not violated by the protection of minorities, but is a
vital aspect of minority rights.2 1 The two principles are explained by the
Sub-Commission on Human Rights:
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf; Hungary ratified the ECHR on May 11, 1992. Signatures
and Ratifications of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, in EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note 94,
at 62.
275. See Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4.
276. Hungarian Status Law, supra note 1.
277. Venice Comm'n Rep., supra.note 4 (citing with approval, Framework Convention,
supra note 50, art. 4.
278. Framework Convention, supra note 50, art. 4.
279. Id. art. 4(2)-(3).
280. Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4.
281. Thornberry, supra note 19, at 18.
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1. Prevention of discrimination is the prevention of any action
which denies to individuals or groups of people equality of
treatment which they may wish.
2. Protection of minorities is the protection of non-dominant
groups which, while wishing in general for equality of treatment
with the majority, wish for a measure of differential treatment in
order to preserve basic characteristics which they possess and
which distinguish them from the majority of the population....
It follows that differential treatment of such groups or
individuals belonging to such groups is justified when it is
exercised in the interest of their contentment and the welfare of
the community as a whole 2
Thus, preferential treatment afforded to the Hungarian minority
outside of Hungary with the goal of promoting cultural and linguistic ties
with the home State are legitimate. However, as discussed above, any
action taken to promote economic and political goals of the kin-State are
illegitimate, no matter how proportionate the means employed. 3 Such
objectives have no place in the Status Law.
VII. THE STATUS LAW AND EUROPEAN UNION LAW
Hungary is set to accede to the European Union in May 2004.284 The
European Commission has expressed concerns that the Hungarian Status
Law is not in conformity with EU norms.285 As a member of the
European Union, an area of cooperation and nondiscrimination, Hungary
would be bound to ensure freedom of movement to workers and to abide
by the principle of nondiscrimination.
282. Id. (internal citations omitted).
283. See Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 402.
284. See 2002 Regular Report on Hungary's Progress Towards Accession, COM(2002)
700 final [hereinafter Regular Report on Accession].
285. Id. at 123 ("In order to complete preparations for membership, Hungary's efforts
now need to focus on ensuring that its foreign policy orientation remains in line with the
Union's developing foreign and security policy .... In particular, Hungary should ensure that
its national policies and practice conform to the EU's common positions .... As regards the
'status law', the Commission will continue to monitor the situation and will request Hungary
to bring the law ... in line with the ... provisions enshrined in the EC Treaty.").
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A. Freedom of Movement
The Treaty establishing the European Community grants freedom of
movement for workers within the Community.286 This freedom of
movement allows workers to move uninhibited within the territory of the
European Union with the purpose of securing employment. Under the
Europe Agreements, a State must ensure that citizens of all EU Member
States are granted the right to self-employment once they have fulfilled
the requirements of Hungarian immigration law. 288 As the Status Law
refers to a certain category of foreigners, it could contradict the
European directives regarding free movement of persons and the right to
work.289
B. Principle of Nondiscrimination
The Hungarian Status Law violates the principle of
nondiscrimination as enshrined in the European Union. Article 12 of the
EC Treaty grants that "[w]ithin the scope of application of this Treaty,
and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited. 29°
The European Union first addressed the conflict between the Status
Law and the principle of nondiscrimination in the context of the
application of the Status Law to Austria.29' The EU successfully
demanded that Status Law not apply to Hungarians living in Austria.292
As citizens of the European Union, Austrian Hungarians cannot be
allotted rights beyond those afforded the rest of the citizens of the
European Union.293
286. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, art. 12, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C
340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. The "European Union" is made up of three pillars: the
European Union, the European Community, and Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal
Matters (PJCC). This Note refers to the European Union, meaning all three pillars.
287. Id. art. 39(3)(a)-(b).
288. See, e.g., Elspeth Guild & Nicolas Rollason, Presentation to the Hungarian
Embassy, The Right of Self Employment in the EC/Hungary Agreement, Practical Application
for Hungarian Nationals Seeking to Reside in the UK (June 6, 2000), available at http://
freespace.virgin.net/andras.hirschler/work.htm.
289. See Spinant, supra note 163 (citing Romanian News Agency, Mediafax, which
reported that Zolt Nemeth, Hungarian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs acknowledged this
concern while expressing confidence that the problem could be overcome and that the Status
Law could apply after Hungarian accession to the European Union.)
290. EC TREATY art. 12.
291. Controversial Status Law Accepted, supra note 162.
292. Id.
293. See id.
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VIII. CURRENT (AND FUTURE) STATUS OF THE STATUS LAW
While the Status Law came into effect on January 1, 2002, the
implementation of the law is far from complete. This Part focuses on the
reaction of Romania, Slovakia, and the European Union to the
Hungarian Status Law. It discusses the changes that have been made to
the Hungarian Status Law to meet the objections of the international
community.
Many events served as the catalyst of change for the Hungarian
Status Law. Hungary was met with criticism of the Status Law almost
immediately after it passed through Parliament.9 Continued criticism
from neighboring countries, the Venice Commission, and the EU
Commissioner on Enlargement, Gunter Verheugen, led the government
of Hungary to amend the Status Law in an attempt to conform with
291international law norms.
First, Hungary contacted Romania to discuss amendments to the
Status Law.96 Romania has consistently objected to the Status Law on
the dual basis that it contravenes EU principles and that the Hungarian
government did not consult the Romanian government before passage of
the Act.
297
In late December 2002, Romanian foreign minister Mircea Geoana
and his Hungarian counterpart Laszlo Kovics met in Bucharest to
discuss amending the Hungarian Status Law. The two ministers agreed
that the Status Law will be amended and that the final draft will keep
with "European standards, norms and principles of international law, as
well as with the community law."29 The result of the meeting was an
agreement that the Status Law will conform with the Romanian legal
294. See PACE Chairman Criticizes Hungarian Status Law, RFE/RL NEWSLINE (June
26, 2001), available at http://www.rferl.org/ucs/2001/06126-270601.html. ("Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) Chairman Lord Russell-Johnston ... said he
'disagrees' with the recently passed Hungarian Status Law and does not 'even believe the law
can bring about an improvement of the situation of members of the Hungarian minority in
neighboring countries.' "); Rom. Gov't Declaration, supra note 3 ("The Law in its entirety has
a discriminatory character, in contradiction with the international documents applicable in the
field of minorities.").
295. Romanian Foreign Minister: Hungarian Status Law Must Comply with EU Norms,
BBC MONITORING EUR., Dec. 10, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, BBC Worldwide
Monitoring; Mihaela Gherghisan, Romania and Hungary agreed over the status law,
EUOBSERvER.COM, Dec. 12, 2002 ("The law will be amended in line with EU principles that
countries may not have a law that applies abroad and six major modifications will be made.").
296. Gherghisan, supra note 295.
297. Id.; Rom. Gov't Declaration, supra note 3 ("The Law concerning the Hungarians of
the neighboring countries was adopted without taking into account the position expressed by
the Romanian side in all its demarches.").
298. Romanian Foreign Minister: Hungarian Status M Comply with EU Norms, supra
note 295.
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system, therefore safeguarding the identity of ethnic Hungarians in
Romania.299
Slovakia has been less agreeable than Romania regarding the
Hungarian Status Law. This is the cause of developing conflict between
the two countries. Political parties on both sides of the border see the
conflict as abuse of nationalist sentiments "for the purpose of domestic
political campaigning for the forthcoming elections in their respective
countries."3"
Hungary amended the Status Law and presented it to Prime Minister
Dzurinda in December 2002; he promptly rejected, to the surprise of
many."' EU Commissioner Gunter Verheugen's involvement initially
enhanced Slovakia's position in the controversy."2 Commissioner
Verheugen issued a letter in December objecting to certain elements of
the Status Law. The Commissioner objected to the creation of a
"political bond" between Hungary and minorities in kin-States; the
extraterritorial and discriminatory effect of the Status Law; and the
Status Law's incompatibility with EU law.3"3 The Commissioner
currently denies that his letter has any legal authority. 3' Instead, he
insists that the Venice Commission Report is "definitive., 305 The
Hungarian State Secretary Andras Barsony proposed in a letter to the
Slovak government in Bratislava "seven principles" to serve as the basis
for change in the Status Law.3°6 Slovakia has not responded 'to this
299. Mihaela Gherghisan, Hungarian Status Law Not for EU Citizens,
EUOBSERVER.COM, Jan. 3, 2003, at http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=8896.
300. Press Release, Joint Statement on the Status Law of SZDSZ of Hungary and LDU
of Slovakia, Jan. 17 2002 (on file with author). The Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) of
Hungary and the Liberal Democratic Union (LDU) of Slovakia recognize that the Status Law
may violate international law, but agree "that minorities should not become the hostages of
malicious political forces, who try to build their political strength on historical nationalism."
Id.
301. The Prime Minister of Slovakia's coalition party is the Hungarian Coalition Party
(SMK). See Mihaela Gherghisan, Slovakia EU Referendum Set for 16 and 17 May,
EUOBSERVER.COM, Dec. 19, 2002, at http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtmlaid=8827;
Mihaela Gherghisan, Hungary Status Law Not for EU Citizens, supra note 299.
302. Hungarian Opposition Slams Government over Status Law Change After EU Letter,
BBC MONITORING EUR., Dec. 19, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, BBC Worldwide
Monitoring.
303. Verheugen, supra note 5.
304. EU Enlargement Commissioner Declines Statement on Hungarian Status Law
(Hungarian Radio broadcast, Jan. 8, 2003).
305. Id.
306. Slovakia Not to Reply to Hungary's Letter on Status Law Changes, BBC
MONITORING EUR., Jan. 14, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, BBC Worldwide
Monitoring.
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letter,"7 though each country's respective foreign ministers may discuss
the law in early 2003.308
As of December 18, 2002, the Hungarian government has made
many concessions to the international community.39 The government
stated: (1) it will grant support to Hungarians only with the agreement of
the countries concerned; (2) no legal or political connections would be
established between Hungary and the Hungarians living abroad; (3) the
Hungarian ID card will only be used to prove the entitlement to
preferences granted by Hungary; and (4) the Status Law will not apply to
EU Member States.31°
Granting support to Hungarians only with the agreement of the
countries concerned is tantamount to entering into a bilateral agreement
with concerned countries. Subjecting assistance to Hungarians on the
approval of neighboring countries radically changes the implementation
of the Hungarian Status Law.
Both the Venice Commission and Commissioner Verheugen objected
to the risk that the identity card given by Hungary to the minorities in
kin-States would create a political or legal bond between the two
parties."' The Hungarian Dependent Certificate, as authorized by the
Hungarian Standing Conference, had the characteristics of an identity
card and the potential to create a political bond with Hungary.32 The
guarantee that no political bond will exist between Hungary and the
Hungarians living abroad, coupled with the explicit denial of use of the
Certificate as an identity card removes this threat.
The concession that the Status Law will not apply to EU Member
States is significant in that it will not jeopardize Hungary's accession to
the Union. To accede to the European Union, Hungary must assume the
obligations of membership, "the legal and institutional framework,
known as the acquis, by means of which the Union implements its
objectives."33 If Hungary fails to "ensure alignment with the acquis on
307. Id.
308. Gherghisan, supra note 299. At the time of this printing, no such meeting had
occurred.
309. Hungarian Opposition Slams Government over Status Law Change After EU Letter,
supra note 302.
310. This means that the law will not apply to ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia once
Slovakia joins the EU. See Gherghisan, supra note 299.
311. Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4; Verheugen, supra note 5.
312. Verheugen, supra note 5. Verheugen's letter states that the Hungarian Dependent
Certificate has the characteristics of an identity card or a passport and has St. Stephen's crown
on the cover. St. Stephen's crown is a "symbol representing all members of the Hungarian
nation." Paul Nemes, Crown Fever, 2 CENTRAL EUR. REV. (Jan. 10, 2000), available at
http://www.ce-review.org/00/I/nemes I.html.
313. Regular Report on Accession, supra note 284, at 37.
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anti-discrimination based on [article] 13 of the Treaty '  its accession to
the Union will be jeopardized. The political and legal controversy
surrounding the divergence of the Status Law with EU principles and
directives was always at the risk of being a moot point. Ethnic
Hungarians would lose their privileges under the Status Law once
Hungary becomes a member of the European Union."' Indeed, one
Hungarian official noted that due to the fact that the Status Law does not
observe EU regulations regarding nondiscrimination among EU citizens,
it will become obsolete once Hungary joins the EU.3 6
LX. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS REVISITED
While the Hungarian Status Law is an inappropriate mechanism to
ensure the protection of the Hungarian minority in Eastern Europe, the
controversy caused by passage of the law reflects the need for action to
be taken on behalf of the Hungarian minority in Europe. The enactment
of the Hungarian Status Law reflects the attempt of the Hungarian
government to address the minority issue in the region.3 7 Rather, the
situation of minorities in Central Eastern Europe demands a solution.3"8
The rights of the Hungarian minority must be protected and allowed to
preserve cultural and educational links with Hungary. The most
appropriate means to this end is the use of bilateral treaties. This Part
314. Id. at 60.
315. Miklos Haraszti, The Debacle of the Status Law, BUDAPEST Bus. J., Jan. 14, 2002
("But in fact, the law was a cruel ruse, since all the benefits it offered must melt away the very
moment this country enters the EU. As Hungary looks to be safely within the first five
candidates, that moment could, by a conservative estimate, come in two years' time. Thus,
soon after obtaining their Hungarian certificates, the beneficiaries would be stripped of the
favors that come with it .... ).
316. Eugen Tomiuc, Hungary: Six-Month-Old Status Law Attracts Few Applicants, Much
Trouble, RFE/RL NEWSWARE, June 19, 2002, available at www.rferl.org/nca/feastures/2002/06/
19062002144958.asp.
317. E-mail from Anonymous, to Christin J. Albertie (Jan. 8, 2003, 13:29 EST) (on file
with author).
318. Id. Hungary is spearheading a proposal to the European Union for further measures
of minority protection. Joszef Szijer, Hungarian Representative in the European Union, has
called for the creation of a committee for minorities. Due to the fact that EU legislation
contains only a few antidiscrimination provisions, Mr. Szdjer would like to draw minority
issues to the attention of EU law makers. This committee would not only address the concerns
of the Hungarian minority, but would primarily benefit the Roma, one of the largest minorities
in Europe. Hungarians Push for Minority Rights in the EU, EUOBsERVER.COM, Feb. 27, 2003,
at http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=9513. The Committee on Minorities would
address the "cultural, educational, and economic problems of minorities." Mihaela
Gherghisan, Hungarian Party Proposes EU Minorities Committee, EUOBSERVER.COm, Feb.
12, 2003, at http://www.euobserver/index.phtml?aid=9344.
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explores the benefits of adopting a bilateral agreement standard for
addressing concerns regarding the Hungarian minority.
A. Pacta Sunt Servanda
The Hungarian Status Law violates the principle of pacta sunt
servanda.3 9 The principle of pacta sunt servanda means that treaties
must be respected and performed in good faith.32° Thus, if a State is party
to a bilateral treaty concerning minority protection, it must fulfill the
obligations stated in the treaty.321 Often, bilateral treaties on minority
protection include a provision ensuring bilateral talks on the
effectiveness of the treaty, implementation problems, and modification of
rights in the treaty.322 A State breaches its obligation by acting
unilaterally in areas addressed by the treaty.323 Thus, the Venice
Commission declared, "Legislation or regulations on the preferential
treatment of kin-minorities should therefore not touch upon areas
demonstrably pre-empted by existing bilateral treaties?
' 24
The Hungarian Status Law addresses topics addressed in at least one
bilateral treaty, the Treaty Between the Republic of Hungary and
Romania on Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighborliness.323
The Hungary-Romania Treaty confirms that the Parties shall respect the
"territorial integrity of the other Party."326 The bilateral treaty
incorporates the Framework Convention to regulate the rights of national
minorities living on their territories327 and provides for cultural and
educational provisions similar to those in the Hungarian Status Law.3 2
The unilateral action taken by the Hungarian government in the Status
Law covers subject matter addressed in the Hungary-Romania Treaty.329
The Status Law does not address new topics in the field of minority
rights. Thus, Hungary's unilateral action violates the principle of pacta
sunt servanda. Hungary should abandon the Status Law and revert to the
bilateral treaties into which it previously entered.
319. Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4.
320. Id.; Vienna Convention, supra note 205, art. 26.
321. Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4.
322. Id.
323. Id.; see also Vienna Convention, supra note 205, art. 31 ("A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.").
324. Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4.
325. Hungary-Romania Treaty, supra note 183.
326. Id. art. 4.
327. Id. art. 15(a).
328. Id. art. 12.
329. Id. arts. 4, 9; Hungarian Status Law, supra note 1.
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B. Benefits of Bilateral Agreements
Bilateral treaties are the optimal mechanism to ensure the protection
of all minorities in Central Eastern Europe. This Part examines the many
benefits of bilateral treaties, especially compared to the Hungarian Status
Law.
First, bilateral agreements do not violate general principles of
international law. Rather, they represent mutual agreement between two
countries. As a result, bilateral treaties respect the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of each contracting State. The Status Law does not
respect the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the neighboring States."'
It has effect on foreign citizens in a foreign country, and violates
principles of nondiscrimination and pacta sunt servanda. On the other
hand, the Hungary-Romania Treaty specifically addressed these issues
while maintaining respect for these general principles of international
law. 3
Second, bilateral treaties are more effective than general
international agreements in effectively protecting minority rights.
General international agreements and mechanisms, as we have seen,
often fall short of adequately ensuring the rights of minorities. On the
other hand, bilateral treaties "constitute exceptions to the blandness of
general legal standards by identifying specific beneficiaries. 332 Bilateral
agreements are specifically tailored by two parties to address issues most
important to the contracting parties. They often recognize ethnic groups
and grant them cultural, religious, linguistic, and national political
rights.333 They produce rules on nondiscrimination while including
provisions adapted to specific minorities.334
Hungary has taken advantage of this ability to customize minority
rights standards in bilateral treaties. Hungary and Slovakia entered into a
bilateral agreement to strengthen human rights guarantees to minorities
living in their countries. 35 This Treaty generally follows the formulas of
330. Hungarian Status Law, supra note 1.
331. See Hungary-Romania Treaty, supra note 183, arts. 4, 14, 21. Article 4 addresses
territorial integrity, article 14 addresses nondiscrimination, and article 21 addresses treaty
interpretation and dispute settlement.
332. Id. art. 17.
333. MINORITY RIGHTS GRoUP REPORT, supra note 23, at 17.
334. See, e.g., State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic
Austria, art. 7(1), May 15, 1955, 217 U.N.T.S. 223 (1955) ("Austrian nationals of the Slovene
and Croat minorities in Carinthia, Burgenland and Styria shall enjoy the same rights on equal
terms as all other Austrian Nationals, including the right to their own organizations, meetings
and press in their own language."); Protection of Minorities: Special Protective Measures of an
International Charter for Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Groups, U.N. Sales No. 67.XIV3,
cited in MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP REPORT, supra note 23, at 17.
335. Supra note 200.
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the Framework Convention.336  Hungary and Slovakia took the
opportunity to engage in specific agreement and strengthened the
programmatic and voluntary obligations found throughout the
Framework Convention.337 Similarly, the provisions of the 1996 Treaty
between Hungary and Croatia33 reflect Croatia's pro-autonomy
attitude.339 The Hungary-Croatia Treaty is less rigid and does not follow
the Framework Convention's formulas.3 40 Hungary's use of bilateral
treaties with its neighbors to focus on different rights and obligations
evidences the flexibility of bilateral treaties.
Similarly, bilateral treaties are superior to the Hungarian Status Law
and general international standards in that they include specific
implementation measures .1" The Framework Convention and other
programmatic obligation-type documents lack implementation
mechanisms and enforcement measures. Likewise, though the Status
Law took effect in January 2002, its implementation has been blocked by
both Slovakia and Romania.142 Conversely, bilateral treaties contain
specifically tailored enforcement methods and are governed by the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.3 43 A bilateral treaty does not
contain implementation provisions as broad as a general instrument of
international law nor as narrow as those of the Hungarian Status Law.
Bilateral agreements build mutual trust and promote good-
neighborly relations between countries.344 By affirming commitments to
respect territorial integrity34' and promote reciprocal minority rights,
bilateral treaties promote good-neighborliness emphasized in the Pact on
Stability.346 Good-neighborliness is an essential element of a stable
Europe "in which human rights, including those of persons belonging to
national minorities, are respected" and "equal and sovereign States
cooperate across frontiers. 3 7 The conclusion of bilateral treaties and
336. Kovcs, supra note 98, at 107.
337. Id.
338. Hungary-Croatia Treaty, supra note 174.
339. KovAcs, supra note 98, at 106.
340. Id.
341. MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP REPORT, supra note 23, at 17.
342. The Status Law was to enter into force on January 1, 2002. Hungarian Status Law,
supra note 1, art. 27(l).
343. See Vienna Convention, supra note 205.
344. Elizabeth F Defeis, Minority Protections and Bilateral Agreements: An Effective
Mechanism, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 291, 321 (1999).
345. Id.
346. Pact on Stability in Europe, supra note 189, art. 4.
347. Id. art. 5.
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implementation further stimulates good-neighborliness and cooperation
among neighbor States."'
On the contrary, the passage of the Hungarian Status Law implies
that the Hungarian government does not trust State parties to bilateral
treaties to uphold their side of the bargain. This perception creates a
culture of distrust and inhibits cooperation and good-neighborliness
among States in the region. For example, the European Commission, in
its Regular Report on the Accession of Hungary to the European Union
noted that, though in June 2001 Hungary assumed the rotating
presidency of the Visegrdd Group, "dialogue was limited due to disputes
on the Hungarian 'status law.' ,141
Conversely, the Status Law is a unilateral action, promulgated solely
by the Hungarian government for the protection of only the Hungarian
minority."'
Most importantly, bilateral treaties for the protection of national
minorities are effective. Sweden and Finland have provided educational
assistance to co-ethnics in each other's countries by utilizing bilateral
treaties.35'
C. Content of Bilateral Treaties
The numerous benefits of bilateral treaties do not warrant blanket
creation of bilateral treaties. A poorly drafted treaty can have a negative
effect on party relations; a bad treaty is not better than no treaty at all.352
This Section delineates particular elements a bilateral treaty should
contain to ensure that the treaty achieves and maintains effective
minority protection. It concludes that the existing bilateral treaties in
effect between Hungary and its neighbors fulfill the standard exacted
here. Thus, Hungary should abandon the Hungarian Status Law for the
established bilateral treaty approach.
Bilateral agreements should be generally based on universal and
regional legal instruments.353 It is important to keep in mind that these
treaties are not intended as a replacement of international instruments.354
348. PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS THROUGH BILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 35,
at 15.
349. Regular Report on Accession, supra note 284, at 88.
350. Hungarian Status Law, supra note 1.
351. PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS THROUGH BILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 35,
at 35 (citing Pirkko Tjdrna, Paper Presented at a Conference on "Inter-Ethnic Relations and
Regional Co-operation," Bishkek, Kyrgysstan, May 16, 1995).
352. Thornberry, supra note 35, at 159.
353. Pact on Stability in Europe, supra note 189, art. 7; Defeis, supra note 344, at 311.
354. The Pact on Stability, which promotes good-neighborliness and bilateral
agreements, states that these efforts "must be based on effective implementation of the existing
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Rather, they "must be seen as part of the broad international effort to
promote minority rights . . . [which] supplement but do not substitute
[for] general standards." '355 The Hungary-Romania Treaty incorporates by
reference relevant international standards for minority protections as
embodied in international instruments. 356 Such instruments include the
Document on the Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimensions of the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1990,"'7 the
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,358 and
the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.'
Second, the Hungary-Romania Treaty specifically articulates the
minority rights each State determined to be most important. These rights
include the right to use their national language for transactions and for
identification, profess and exercise religious beliefs, and create and
support educational and cultural institutions.' 6° In addition, the Treaty
specifically provides that the both Parties will take positive steps to
promote minority identity.
36
'
Lastly, the Hungary-Romania Treaty affirms the principle of
territorial integrity of States,362 nondiscrimination,3 63 and the principles
outlined in the Framework Convention.3'6 These provisions safeguard
bilateral treaties from the international concern regarding the Hungarian
Status Law.
principles and commitments established within the framework of the UN, OSCE, and the
Council of Europe." Pact on Stability in Europe, supra note 189, art. 7.
355. Thornberry, supra note 35, at 161.
356. Hungary-Romania Treaty, supra note 183. The Annex of the Hungary-Romania
Treaty incorporates the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on Human
Dimension; Declaration of December 18, 1992 of the General Assembly of the United Nations
on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities
(Resolution 47/135); and Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe on an Additional Protocol on the Rights of National Minorities to the
European Convention on Human Rights.
357. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on Human Dimension,
supra note 127.
358. Framework Convention, supra note 50.
359. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, supra note 82.
360. Hungary-Slovakia Treaty, supra note 200, art. 15.
361. The parties "shall take the necessary measures to ensure that such persons can learn
their mother tongue and have adequate opportunities for being educated and trained in this
language at all levels ... [and] ensure the conditions allowing the use also of the mother
tongue of these persons in their relations with local administrative and judicial authorities." Id.
art. 15(3).
362. Id. art. 4.
363. Id. art. 14.
364. Id. art. 15.
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Hungary must follow its own example and focus on bilateral
agreements as an effective means of minority protection. The country
must respect the obligations it has reciprocally undertaken as well as
pursue bilateral talks on the matters which are the subject of the bilateral
agreements.165 Refusal to do so is a breach of specific obligations as well
as a violation of the principle of pacta sunt servanda.366
X. CONCLUSION
The passage of the Hungarian Status Law in the Summer of 2001 reflects
the need for international law to address in a uniform manner the issue of
minority rights and the rights of kin-States in voicing their concerns. The
universal and regional documents and mechanisms providing protection
to minorities fail to meet this goal. The Hungarian Status law, a unilateral
action taken by the Hungarian government, violates major principles of
international law and cannot be adhered to. Rather, Hungary should
abandon the Status Law and revert to use of bilateral agreements to
ensure the rights of the Hungarian minority living outside of Hungary.
Bilateral mechanisms have proven to be effective in the minority rights
arena, and are in accordance with international law.
365. Venice Comm'n Rep., supra note 4.
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